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WAS THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY A MISTAKE? 
 
Michael Selmi
*
 
The disparate impact theory long has been viewed as one of the most 
important and controversial developments in antidiscrimination law.  In this 
Article, Professor Selmi assesses the theory’s legacy and challenges much of the 
conventional wisdom.  Professor Selmi initially charts the development of the 
theory, including a close look at Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and Washington 
v. Davis, to demonstrate that the theory arose to deal with specific instances of 
past discrimination rather than as a broad theory of equality.  In the next 
section, Professor Selmi reviews the success of the theory in the courts through 
an empirical analysis and concludes that it has had a strikingly limited impact 
outside of the context of written employment tests and is, in fact, an extremely 
difficult theory on which to succeed.  In the final section, Professor Selmi contends 
that whatever gains the disparate impact theory has produced likely could have 
been obtained through other means, particularly in large urban cities, and that 
the theory may have had the unintended effect of limiting our conception of 
intentional discrimination.  Disparate impact theory always has been seen as 
beginning where intentional discrimination ends, and by pushing an expansive 
theory of impact, we were left with a truncated theory of intentional 
discrimination that continues to turn on animus and motive.  Rather than a new 
legal theory of discrimination, Professor Selmi concludes, a greater societal 
commitment to remedying inequities was needed, as the ultimate mistake behind 
the disparate impact theory was the belief that legal theory could do the work that 
politics could not. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Within antidiscrimination law, no theory has attracted more attention 
or controversy than the disparate impact theory, which allows proof of 
discrimination without the need to prove an intent to discriminate.  The 
general outlines of the controversy are well known.  In the 1971 landmark 
decision of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,1 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
approved of the theory in the context of statutory employment 
discrimination claims.2  Five years later in the equally momentous Washington 
v. Davis3 the Court refused to extend the theory to constitutional claims, 
holding instead that intentional discrimination is required to establish a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.4  Both of these cases involved 
written employment examinations, but advocates have sought to extend 
the theory to virtually every civil rights context under the perception that 
the disparate impact theory would reach discrimination that was otherwise 
out of reach for claims of intentional discrimination.5  Just last term, the 
                                                                                                                            
 1. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 2. Id. at 436 (interpreting Title VII to include disparate impact cause of action). 
 3. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 4. Id. at 239. 
 5. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that Title VI requires 
proof of intentional discrimination); Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 
(1982) (holding that § 1981 prohibiting discrimination in contracting only applies to claims of 
intentional discrimination); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding that a voting 
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Supreme Court applied the cause of action to age discrimination 
claims, settling a longstanding dispute in the lower courts.6 
Together Griggs and Washington v. Davis are widely seen as two of the 
most influential civil rights decisions ever issued.  The Griggs decision has 
been universally hailed as the most important development in employment 
discrimination law.7  Even critics concede its influence and have long sug-
gested that the theory encourages employers to rely on quotas as a means of 
avoiding disparate impact lawsuits.8  And when adverse Supreme Court 
decisions threatened to eviscerate the Griggs decision, Congress responded 
by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991.9 
The reaction to Washington v. Davis has been equally spirited, though 
in many respects the polar opposite of that for Griggs.  Liberal academics 
have denounced the decision as unjustifiably limiting the scope of the Equal 
Protection Clause, and Charles Lawrence’s renowned article that helped 
                                                                                                                            
rights claim brought under the Fifteenth Amendment required proof of intentional discrimination).  
Before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Sandoval, there was some room for plaintiffs to pursue 
disparate impact claims under Title VI, a statute that requires nondiscrimination by federal 
contractors, pursuant to the regulations that were issued to implement the statute.  See Guardians 
Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
 6. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).  The battle over applying the 
disparate impact theory to age discrimination cases is discussed in Part II.B.2, infra. 
 7. See, e.g., HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 383–86 (1990) (stating that Griggs “burst like a bombshell” 
and discussing its importance); Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, 
and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 433 
(2005) (labeling Griggs “[a]side from Brown . . . the single most influential civil rights case during the 
past forty years”); Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective 
Judgments, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1987) (“Few decisions in our time—perhaps only Brown 
v. Board of Educ.—have had such momentous social consequences [as Griggs].”). 
 8. For example, Richard Epstein, a fierce critic of the theory, has called Griggs “the first 
and single most important Supreme Court decision under Title VII . . . .”  RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 183 (1992).  
Professor Epstein discusses how the force of the disparate impact theory encourages employers to adopt 
“implicit quotas.”  Id. at 234–36; see also John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and 
the Anti-discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 423, 480 (2002) (claiming that disparate impact theory creates a “strong incentive to give 
preferential treatment to minorities”).  Although the link to quotas has been a particular concern 
for conservative critics, the link has long been discussed in the context of the disparate impact 
theory.  See, e.g., Hugh Steven Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: 
Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844, 
873 (1972) (noting that “employers may use privately imposed quotas” to avoid disparate impact 
liability).  For an incisive rebuttal to the quota argument, see Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The 
Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1487 (1996). 
 9. For a discussion of the importance of the disparate impact provisions to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, see Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 955, 984–99 (1993). 
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spawn critical race theory was principally a critique of the Court’s adoption 
of an intent standard.10  In many quarters, constitutional law is still taught 
as if a different, more meaningful concept of equality would have emerged if 
only the Supreme Court had reached a different conclusion in Davis.  
Professor Reva Siegel is representative of this position when she writes that 
had the disparate impact theory been available, “equal protection litigation 
might [have] move[d] the nation closer to disestablishing historic patterns 
of race and gender stratification than current constitutional doctrines now do.”11 
One of the more interesting aspects of the disparate impact theory is that 
its mythology has arisen without any serious exploration of its reality.  For 
example, in the last several years, scholars have offered numerous proposals 
to extend the disparate impact theory to cure all manner of social ills; 
extending the disparate impact doctrine has long been one of the primary 
obsessions of liberal academics and advocates alike.12  Three prominent 
                                                                                                                            
 10. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (“[R]equiring proof of intentional motivation 
as a prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is race-dependent ignores much of what 
we understand about how the human mind works.”).  Several other critical scholars have staked 
their claims with critiques aimed at the intent requirement.  See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, 
But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 953, 968 (1993) (“[T]he Davis rule reflects a distinctively white way of thinking about 
race.”); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A 
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (1978) (critiquing focus 
on intent as part of “perpetrator” perspective).  Paul Brest, on the other hand, helped solidify his 
scholarly reputation with a modest defense of the intent principle.  See Paul Brest, Foreword: In 
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19–22 (1976) (suggesting that 
racially disproportionate impact should not constitute unlawful discrimination). 
 11. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1145 (1997). 
 12. Just in the last few years, the following articles have appeared: Henry L. Chambers, Jr., 
Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 1397 (2002) (urging application 
of disparate impact theory to literacy tests); Carl H. Coleman, The “Disparate Impact” Argument 
Reconsidered: Making Room for Justice in the Assisted Suicide Debate, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 17 (2002) 
(assisted suicide); Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the 
Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861 (2004) (discussing disparate impact theory as applied 
to a disabilities statute); Lara M. Gardner, A Step Toward True Equality in the Workplace: Requiring 
Employer Accommodation for Breastfeeding Women, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259 (2002) (discussing 
the applicability of the disparate impact model to prohibit discrimination against breastfeeding); 
Robert A. Kearney, The Disparate Impact Hostile Environment Claim: Sexual Harassment Scholarship 
at a Crossroads, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 185 (2003) (advocating creation of a disparate 
impact hostile environment claim); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and 
Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 895–98 (2004) (arguing for use of disparate impact 
analysis to ferret out racial stigma); Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: 
Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505 (2004) (exploring application of the 
theory to white male plaintiffs); Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 283 (2003) (advocating use of disparate impact model for gender issues in the 
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employment discrimination scholars have recently called for a revival of the 
theory,13 and several articles in leading law reviews have explored its 
ramifications.14  Yet none of these articles comes to grips with a central 
facet of the theory: Outside of the original context in which the theory 
arose, namely written employment tests, the disparate impact theory has 
produced no substantial social change and there is no reason to think that 
extending the theory to other contexts would have produced meaningful 
reform.  In other words, had Washington v. Davis been decided differently, 
the end results would have been pretty much the same.  Even with written 
tests the theory did not achieve the expected reform, as the vast majority of 
tests continue to have significant adverse impact.15 
As discussed below, the disparate impact theory arose initially to deal 
with specific practices, seniority systems and written tests, that were 
perpetuating past intentional discrimination.16  Although courts have never 
restricted the theory to those particular contexts, the reality has been that 
the theory has proved an ill fit for any challenge other than to written 
examinations, the only category of claim for which legal standards have 
evolved to evaluate the permissibility of employment practices.17  This latter 
point is important and too easily glossed over by both advocates and critics.  
While it is true that the disparate impact theory allows proof of 
discrimination without the need to prove intent, employers are allowed to justify 
their practices under a business necessity test.  Because that test allows for 
                                                                                                                            
virtual workplace); Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579 (2001) (book 
review) (arguing that disparate impact is the most appropriate theory for pay equity claims). 
 13. See Belton, supra note 7, at 469–72 (speculating on the possible future of the theory); Elaine 
W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still Good For? What 
Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597 (2004) (emphasizing the potential of disparate impact theory); Charles 
Sullivan, Re-Reviving Disparate Impact 59 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“The overall 
theme of this Article is that future development of the antidiscrimination project should focus far more 
on the disparate impact as a theory of liability than on disparate treatment.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 
(2001) (comparing the accommodation requirement under a disabilities statute to disparate impact 
theory); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 494 (2003) (exploring the purpose and constitutionality of disparate impact theory). 
 15. See Paul R. Sackett et al., High Stakes Testing in Employment, Credentialing, and Higher 
Education: Prospects in a Post-Affirmative-Action World, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 302, 302 (2001) 
(“In education, employment, and credentialing contexts, test score distributions consistently 
reveal significant mean differences by race.”). 
 16. The two most important formative cases both involved seniority issues.  See Local 189, 
United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).  These cases are discussed in Part I.A, infra. 
 17. Written tests can be validated pursuant to professionally established guidelines.  See 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (discussing guidelines).  As discussed below, 
the guidelines are ill-suited for anything other than written examinations. 
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normative judgments regarding what practices are properly defined as 
discriminatory, courts readily accept most proffered justifications.18 
A central reason for courts’ general acceptance of justifications, I will 
suggest, is that courts never fully accepted the disparate impact theory as a 
legitimate definition of discrimination, or as a legitimate means of proving 
discrimination, and it was a mistake to think that they would.  The dispa-
rate impact theory has often been justified based on the difficulty of proving 
intentional discrimination, particularly in cases where evidence of overt 
bias or animus is lacking.19  Yet, there was no reason to believe that courts 
would be more willing to see discrimination through the lens of disparate 
impact theory when they were unable to do so even through the far more 
common mix of circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination.  
Suggesting otherwise was like offering a pair of glasses to cure blindness, and 
the reality has been that disparate impact claims are more difficult—not 
easier—to prove than claims of intentional discrimination. 
But to suggest that the disparate impact theory has produced less change 
than typically assumed is a far cry from demonstrating that the theory was a 
mistake.  On this score, I will argue that the theory had the rather perverse 
effect of limiting our conception of intentional discrimination, which, in the 
end, may have hindered our efforts to eradicate discrimination more than it 
has plausibly helped.  As a concept, the disparate impact theory begins where 
intentional discrimination ends, and seeking an expansive role for the 
disparate impact theory ultimately has left us with a truncated definition of 
intentional discrimination.  The disparate impact theory has always been 
contrasted with racial animus and motive, and despite the familiar refrains 
regarding how discrimination has become more subtle over time, we continue 
to define intentional discrimination in the context of animus and consciously 
impermissible motives.20  The disparate impact theory also has proven a poor 
vehicle for uncovering subtle discrimination while the intentional discrimina-
tion framework has remained seriously undeveloped, even though it likely 
                                                                                                                            
 18. This issue is discussed in more detail in Part II.B, infra. 
 19. See Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 318, 358 (1987) (suggesting that the Supreme Court established disparate impact theory 
in part based on the difficulty of proving intent); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: 
An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987) (arguing that one justification 
for disparate impact theory is the difficulty of proving intent under disparate treatment models). 
 20. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1172 
(1995) (noting that in pretext cases involving intentional discrimination, “liability is premised on 
the presence of conscious discriminatory animus”).  I return to this theme in Part III.B.3, infra. 
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could have been expanded to include much of what the disparate impact 
theory ultimately captured, while also including more subtle discrimination. 
Developing a more expansive concept of intent would have required a 
far stronger push to redefine intentional discrimination to encompass acts 
that were not tied to old-style discrimination, and it also would have required a 
greater societal commitment to remedying racial, gender and other disparities 
linked to what is often defined as societal discrimination.  Ironically, the 
move to the disparate impact theory may have alleviated some of that 
perceived need as it sent a signal that intentional discrimination was largely a 
thing of the past.  At the same time, it moved away from notions of fault or 
blame that were necessary to trigger greater social responsibility.  With this 
framework in mind, it becomes easier to see how the theory was a mistake 
and, equally important, why it was premised on a deeply mistaken foundation. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I explores the neglected his-
tory of the disparate impact theory, its context, and its evolution in the 
Supreme Court culminating in Washington v. Davis, which I suggest was a 
poorly developed case for extending the theory because the plaintiffs never 
articulated a reason why the city of Washington, D.C. should have been 
held responsible for the disparate effects of its test under any theory of dis-
crimination.  Part II embarks on a different course, as it presents an empiri-
cal analysis of how the disparate impact theory has fared in both the 
appellate and district courts, and I conclude that the theory has had a 
strikingly limited impact.  One of the more important findings of this case 
survey is that a substantial number of successful disparate impact cases also 
succeed under a theory of intentional discrimination, suggesting that the 
impact theory is often superfluous.  I also argue that the theory has rarely 
been successfully stretched beyond the testing context.  Part III lays out my 
argument for why the theory was ultimately a mistake by first demonstrating 
that even the benefits produced in the testing cases likely could have been 
procured either through a broader definition of intentional discrimination, 
one that was available at the time the disparate impact theory arose, or by 
ordinary politics.  Following that discussion is an analysis of how the disparate 
impact theory significantly contributed to our limited understanding of 
intentional discrimination. 
In addition to revealing the limits and restrictions of the disparate 
impact theory, another purpose of this Article is to help revive a more criti-
cal analysis within legal scholarship.  The faith so many scholars and 
advocates have imbued in the disparate impact theory largely ignores much 
of what we have learned about the way in which the law works to preserve 
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social norms rather than to upend them.  Taking seriously the disparate 
impact theory would have posed a substantial challenge to existing prac-
tices, which is precisely why the theory never has been taken particularly 
seriously by courts.  But more than that, one lesson we ought to relearn is 
that we cannot expect the law to do the work that politics cannot. 
I. THE ROAD TO GRIGGS AND BEYOND 
The disparate impact theory is generally associated with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.21  Somewhat remarkably, Griggs 
was only the Supreme Court’s second interpretation of the employment 
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and that interpretation, 
like its first, appeared to greatly expand the scope of the statute.22  At the same 
time, the theory did not arise spontaneously, and one of the least chronicled 
aspects of an otherwise heavily analyzed case is the origins of the disparate 
impact cause of action.23  As discussed in detail below, two important cases, two 
influential law review articles, and a strategic decision by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) all contributed to the 
creation of the theory, which the Court ultimately sanctioned in Griggs. 
A. The Seniority Cases and the Origins of the Disparate Impact Theory 
Much of the concern that gave rise to the disparate impact theory cen-
tered on the perpetuation of past lawful discrimination through what 
appeared to be neutral practices, initially seniority systems and later written 
tests that were imposed after Title VII became applicable.  Prior to the pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, African Americans were widely segre-
gated into undesirable positions that were located within different job 
progression lines from the white workers.24  At the time, many seniority 
systems afforded seniority only within particular jobs.  As a result, regardless 
                                                                                                                            
 21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 22. Like Griggs, the Supreme Court’s first Title VII decision offered a potentially broad 
interpretation of the statute by creating a “sex-plus” claim in which it was possible for plaintiffs to 
allege that a defendant discriminated against a subclass of women, in this case women with pre–
school age children.  See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).  Not 
coincidentally, similar to Griggs, the sex-plus theory has been significantly limited and is now a 
marginal part of discrimination doctrine. 
 23. Professor Robert Belton, one of the lead attorneys in Griggs, recently offered his own 
retrospective, which accords with some of my own treatment though we part company over the 
theory’s ultimate influence.  See Belton, supra note 7, at 435–54. 
 24. See William B. Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 HOWARD L.J. 1 (1967) (describing seniority cases and systems). 
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of their seniority within a particular company, African Americans had to 
start at the bottom of the white job ladder in order to move into the more 
desirable positions.25  Complicating matters further, many of the jobs at the 
bottom of the white progression paid less than the top black positions, and 
many black workers were reluctant to take a pay cut as a way of moving into 
the better jobs.26 
In one of the most important early cases challenging the discriminatory 
effects of seniority systems, Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States,27 
Judge Wisdom framed the matter as  
how to reconcile equal employment opportunity today with seniority 
expectations based on yesterday’s built-in racial discrimination.  May 
an employer continue to award formerly “white jobs” on the basis of 
seniority attained in other formerly white jobs, or must the employer 
consider the employee’s experience in formerly “Negro jobs” as an 
equivalent measure of seniority?28 
As Judge Wisdom noted, unless service experience in the “Negro jobs” was 
applied to the now opened white jobs, senior African American employees 
would find themselves competing with whites for entry-level jobs, and it 
would be many years before they would be able to move up the ranks to bet-
ter positions.  If this were to occur, it would contravene the specific purpose 
of the Act. 
There was, however, an important twist to the Papermakers case that 
reveals an underlying motive for the company’s seniority system that could 
not be properly ascribed to unintentional discrimination, and also illustrates 
why many of the early cases were treated as forms of intentional dis-
crimination.  In the Papermakers case, the EEOC initially approved of the 
seniority system within job titles for future jobs, but the Department of 
Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance, reviewing companies that 
had federal contracts, objected to this arrangement as impermissibly per-
petuating the effects of past discrimination.29  As a condition of maintaining 
federal contracts, the Department of Labor required the company to com-
bine an employee’s time in job with his entire time at the company, and the 
company agreed to this arrangement.30  The union that represented the 
                                                                                                                            
 25. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of 
Hope, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 268, 276–77 (1969). 
 26. Id. 
 27. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 28. Id. at 982–83. 
 29. Id. at 984–85. 
 30. Id. at 985. 
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white employees, however, refused to accept the proposal, and voted to 
strike once the company indicated that it planned to impose the new sys-
tem unilaterally.31  The Justice Department then filed suit to enjoin the 
strike, and perhaps for good measure staked out a third governmental posi-
tion by seeking to enjoin the use of seniority altogether.32 
The company, a codefendant in the Justice Department lawsuit, subse-
quently defended its seniority system by focusing narrowly on the absence 
of a present intent to discriminate.  The company argued that it had ceased 
to discriminate once Title VII became effective and “[t]he fact that the 
system continues to prefer whites over previously hired Negroes in filling 
certain vacancies does not in itself show racial discrimination.  That effect, 
the defendants argue[d, was] merely an ineradicable consequence of extinct 
racial discrimination.”33  As with the practices subsequently challenged in 
Griggs, no one asserted that the seniority system had been preserved with 
a specific, or primary, intent to discriminate against African American work-
ers, and for this reason there did not appear to be intentional discrimination 
as traditionally defined, although later in the opinion the court suggested 
that such intent was present.34  The nature of that intent, however, was tied 
to the central purpose of Title VII rather than to the motive of the actor.  
The purpose of the Act, the court noted, was to provide employment 
opportunities previously denied routinely and systematically to African 
Americans; allowing job seniority to determine employment opportunities 
would continue to “freeze” out the intended beneficiaries of the legislation, 
a fact the Supreme Court had previously recognized and sought to remedy 
in the voting rights context.35  As Judge Wisdom explained, “It is not 
                                                                                                                            
 31. See id. at 984–85. 
 32. Id. at 985.  Toward the end of its opinion, the Fifth Circuit noted, “We cannot help 
sharing Crown Zellerbach’s bewilderment at the twists and turns indulged in by government 
agencies in this case.”  Id. at 997. 
 33. Id. at 986. 
 34. Id. at 997 (“The requisite intent may be inferred from the fact that the defendants 
persisted in the conduct after its racial implications had become known to them.  Section 707(a) 
demands no more.”). 
 35. Id. at 987–88, 990–91.  With respect to voting rights, the notion of a “freeze out” had 
two meanings.  On the one hand, entrenched past practices could freeze out African Americans, 
even if not implemented with a specific intent to do so.  See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 
(1965).  Conversely, the Fifth Circuit developed what was known as a “freeze theory” as a remedy 
for voting rights violations.  Under that theory, no new practices could be implemented because of 
their discriminatory effects, and courts froze the standards at a particular time as a way of avoiding 
new hurdles.  See United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964).  In Griggs, the Supreme 
Court mentioned the concept, which was also discussed more extensively by the dissenting judge 
in the prior appellate decision.  See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (“Under 
the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, 
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decisive therefore that a seniority system may appear to be neutral on its 
face if the inevitable effect of tying the system to the past is to cut into the 
employees present right not to be discriminated against on the ground of 
race.”36  To the court, this was more than remedying the present effects of 
past discrimination; it was present discrimination that could be tolerated 
only through a legitimate justification.  This is where the business necessity 
language entered the analysis: “When an employer or union has dis-
criminated in the past and when its present policies renew or exaggerate 
discriminatory effects, those policies must yield, unless there is an overrid-
ing legitimate, non-racial business purpose.”37 
The Fifth Circuit in Papermakers specifically referred to this business 
purpose as a “business necessity,” a concept it borrowed from a pre–Title 
VII case involving dual seniority systems where the court had struggled with 
a similar issue.  In Whitfield v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 2708,38 
the employer had maintained two racially separate job classifications but 
was required to merge them in light of Supreme Court precedent interpret-
ing the National Labor Relations Act.39  The two job lines, however, “were 
not so functionally related that experience at the top of the formerly black 
line could provide adequate training for the bottom jobs in the white 
line.”40  To comply with the Supreme Court mandate, and ensure that the 
employees would be qualified for the jobs, the company required black 
employees to take a qualifications test to move into the positions that for-
merly had been held exclusively by white employees, even though the 
incumbent white employees were not required to take the test.  The Fifth 
Circuit upheld the requirement noting that “[s]uch a system was conceived out of 
business necessity, not out of racial discrimination.  An employee without 
proper training and with no proof of potential ability to rise higher, cannot 
expect to start in the middle of the ladder, regardless of plant seniority.”41 
In contrast to the Whitfield case, the Fifth Circuit saw no business jus-
tification in Papermakers for allocating positions based on job rather than 
                                                                                                                            
cannot be maintained if they operate to “freeze” the status quo of prior discriminatory 
employment practices.”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1247 (4th Cir. 1970) 
(Sobeloff, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the freeze theory in voting rights). 
 36. Papermakers, 416 F.2d at 988. 
 37. Id. at 989. 
 38. 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959). 
 39. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (requiring certified 
unions to represent members of the bargaining unit on a nondiscriminatory basis). 
 40. Papermakers, 416 F.2d at 993. 
 41. Id. (quoting Whitfield, 263 F.2d at 550).  Following Papermakers, the Fifth Circuit 
repudiated Whitfield as no longer defensible after Title VII.  See Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., 429 F.2d 
498 (5th Cir. 1970). 
712 53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 701 (2006) 
 
plant seniority.  In making this determination, the court focused exclusively 
on the qualifications necessary to perform the job while ignoring whatever 
morale issues might otherwise justify the policy.  The court also specifically 
noted that only qualified individuals would be eligible for the positions 
regardless of seniority.42  Equally important, without an adequate business 
justification, the court saw the perpetuation of past discrimination as a form 
of intentional ongoing discrimination: “When an employer adopts a system 
that necessarily carries forward the incidents of discrimination into the pre-
sent, his practice constitutes on-going discrimination, unless the incidents 
are limited to those that safety and efficiency require.”43 
Although the Papermakers case offers critical insight into the devel-
opment of the disparate impact theory, it was not the sole source of the 
theory.  As the case makes clear, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on two 
articles published in the Harvard Law Review,44 and a Virginia federal dis-
trict court case that proved especially influential.  In Quarles v. Philip 
Morris, Inc.,45 the plaintiffs challenged a number of the defendant’s employ-
ment practices at its Richmond, Virginia cigarette factory as intentionally 
discriminatory, relying primarily on statistical disparities in the hiring and 
promotion process to establish discriminatory intent.  The plaintiffs lost 
those claims with little analysis by the district court and prevailed only on 
the wage claims of two African American employees.46  In addition to chal-
lenging those employment practices, the plaintiffs also challenged the 
transfer and seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement as 
“intentional, unlawful employment practices.”47  The substance of this claim 
was effectively identical to that raised in the Papermakers case, but the 
analysis was subtly different, including a more detailed focus on how the 
maintenance of the seniority system was a form of intentional 
                                                                                                                            
 42. As a defense to the policy, the employer offered an expert witness to testify about the 
effect the government’s policy would have on the plant but, according to the court, his testi-
mony centered on allowing unqualified individuals to bid on jobs or jump over jobs based on seniority.  
Papermakers, 416 F.2d at 989–90.  It is worth noting that the company’s defense was certainly 
weakened in that it was willing to go along with the policy but for the white union’s opposition, 
and it appears that the union was seeking to protect its members.  The company also seemed to go 
to substantial lengths to protect the interests of that union. 
 43. Id. at 994. 
 44. See George Cooper & Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment 
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 
(1969) and Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1260 (1967).  Cooper and Sobol were attorneys involved in the Papermakers case, as well as in 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), discussed infra Part I.D. 
 45. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). 
 46. Id. at 509–10. 
 47. Id. at 510. 
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discrimination.  At one point, the court even equated the two: “The court 
finds that the defendants have intentionally engaged in unlawful 
employment practices by discriminating on the ground of race against Quarles, 
and other Negroes similarly situated.  This discrimination, embedded in sen-
iority and transfer provisions of collective bargaining agreements, adversely 
affects the conditions of employment and opportunities for advancement of 
the class.”48 
By the time of Papermakers, many scholars already were highlighting 
the importance of altering seniority systems to ensure that the purposes of 
Title VII were fulfilled.  From Quarles and Papermakers, it seems clear that 
what has come to be defined as the disparate impact theory arose initially, and 
primarily, in the context of the discriminatory effects of seniority systems.49  
In its enforcement efforts, the United States also targeted unions’ desire to 
preserve discriminatory seniority systems.50 These seniority cases were 
distinctive in a number of important ways.  For example, none of the courts 
specifically discussed a disparate impact theory, although they did discuss 
the discriminatory effects of what appeared to be a neutral seniority 
system—neutral in that it was not implemented with the explicit, or estab-
lished, motive of excluding African Americans from desirable jobs.  But as 
the discussions in both Papermakers and Quarles suggest, there was a significant 
question as to why job seniority was being preserved in these plants on the 
basis of what were now unlawful job distinctions.  Moreover, the Quarles 
case specifically defined the continuance of the system as a form of 
intentional discrimination.  The vast majority of seniority cases were also 
distinctive in that they involved employers that had previously discriminated 
                                                                                                                            
 48. Id. at 519. 
 49. See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 25, at 294 (“To require that Negro employees remain 
subordinate to white employees based on historic discrimination would constitute a deprivation of 
employment opportunity and an adverse effect on employment status because of race in violation 
of the statute.”); Gould, supra note 24 (describing the way seniority systems preserved past 
intentional discrimination); William B. Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on 
Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1969).  Gould observes:  
If Congress intended to bring into being an integrated work force, however, and not 
merely to create a paper plan meaningless to Negro workers, the only acceptable 
legislative intent on past discrimination is one that requires unions and employers to root 
out the past discrimination embodied in presently nondiscriminatory seniority 
arrangements so that black and white workers have equal job advancement rights. 
Id. at 1042. 
 50. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); United States 
v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local Union No. 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); United 
States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).  The Papermakers case was also 
brought by the United States. 
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explicitly against their African American employees, so that the 
challenged systems perpetuated past intentional discrimination.51 
B. Testing Cases and the EEOC 
The disparate impact theory clearly took a different turn in the testing 
context, but it was a turn anticipated in the seniority cases and one based 
on similar concerns regarding the perpetuation of past lawful discrimina-
tion.52  Given the vast inequities in school education systems among white 
and black schoolchildren, imposing written tests as a condition of employ-
ment predictably would have the effect of perpetuating segregated job clas-
sifications.  Like the seniority cases, the testing cases arose principally 
among employers that had engaged in prior intentional discrimination.  
Although it may have been difficult to prove that an employer instituted a test 
with the specific motive to continue to segregate African Americans, it 
took no great leap of faith to understand that the testing requirement did 
just that.  Indeed, Professor Alfred Blumrosen, an important scholar and 
partial architect of the disparate impact theory, argued that instituting tests 
or maintaining seniority systems that had the probable effect of excluding 
African Americans should be defined as intentional discrimination under 
basic tort law.53  Ultimately, this was a road not taken, but it is important to 
emphasize that these cases could have been, and in some instances were, 
defined as involving intentional discrimination.54 
                                                                                                                            
 51. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971) (invalidating a 
departmental seniority system based on prior discrimination); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 
431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970) (treating a no-transfer policy as akin to seniority as a means to perpetuate 
discrimination); United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1970) (finding that 
seniority in segregated lines prevented transfers). 
 52. As was true with the seniority issue, one of the more influential articles was a student 
note.  See Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and 
Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691 (1968).  Others likewise focused on the way tests had been 
introduced into the employment process.  See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 44. 
 53. ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 176 (1971) (“I 
conclude that the intent requirement of Title VII is the intent requirement of a civil action in 
tort—that the defendant be aware of the consequences of his action which are reasonably certain 
to flow from his behavior.”). 
 54. This issue is discussed in more detail in Part IV.A., infra.  As one example, a Mississippi 
district court invalidated the use of Graduate Record Examinations (GRE) scores and a master’s 
degree requirement for school teachers because of the expected effects of the policies.  See 
Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 325 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Miss. 1971).  The court 
noted, “Racial differentials like those above mentioned were expected by defendants when they 
adopted [the p]olicy,” id. at 568, and went on, “[T]he court concludes that the School 
Board, in adopting the policy, knew or should have known that its implementation would bar 
more black than white teachers from reemployment and hiring by the district.”  Id.  On appeal, 
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Despite the acknowledgements that both tests and the seniority 
systems perpetuated past intentional discrimination, courts were largely 
receptive to the employers’ claims that they needed to ensure that the 
African American employees were qualified for the newly opened 
positions.55  This contention was not easily dismissed given that African 
Americans had been denied the opportunity for training and advancement 
in the past.  Not surprisingly, past intentional discrimination rendered 
many African Americans unqualified, or less qualified, for the jobs that 
were now open to them.  Again, this is where the business necessity test 
came in—to ensure that employees were truly qualified for the positions 
they sought.56  But this also clearly could be a pretext for frustrating the 
purposes of the statute: If employers’ past discrimination could serve as a 
basis for denying new opportunities to African Americans, it would have 
taken many years for them to realize any gains in the workplace—just as was 
true with the seniority systems. 
Although seniority systems and written tests were surely different, 
their similarities are more important to understanding the origins of the 
disparate impact theory and its ultimate limits.  In both the seniority and 
the testing cases, the issue was the perpetuation of past intentional but 
lawful discrimination that would contravene the purposes of the legislation.  
As a result, the disparate impact theory was not seen initially as a broad 
alternative concept of discrimination, but rather, the cause of action origi-
nated to deal with specific issues involving past intentional discrimination.57 
It was the EEOC, not the Courts, that conceived of the theory as a 
potential alternative approach to discrimination, and it did so in part for 
strategic considerations.  According to Professor Blumrosen, who was a 
high-level EEOC official at the time, it quickly became clear that negotiations 
with employers would be smoother if they could move away from a focus on 
intentional discrimination, which carried with it an implicit label of blame 
                                                                                                                            
the decision was upheld with respect to the GRE scores but not the master’s degree 
requirement.  See Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 55. Professor William Gould was critical of this aspect of the cases, and singled out the 
Quarles decision, otherwise commonly viewed as beneficial to plaintiffs, as more “harmful than 
helpful.”  Gould, supra note 49, at 1074. 
 56. See Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 990 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(emphasizing that “no employee would have a right to a job that he could not perform properly”); 
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 518 (E.D. Va. 1968) (noting that “[m]any 
Negroes, regardless of seniority, are not qualified for supervisory positions”). 
 57. Ironically, the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the argument that seniority systems 
that perpetuated pre-Act discrimination violated Title VII.  See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) . 
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that employers were expected to resist.58  To the EEOC, and to plaintiffs 
more generally, it mattered little how a particular act was defined so long as 
the power to remedy the effects was available.  It was also conceivable that 
judges would be more receptive to a theory based on unintentional 
discrimination, whereas they might have been reluctant to identify 
employers as intentional discriminators with all that such a label was meant 
to convey.  As discussed below, this strategic decision may have had an 
understandable appeal at the time, but it was based on a mistaken founda-
tion because it required courts and employers to accept the disparate impact 
theory as embodying an identifiable form of discrimination.  Yet, the farther 
removed one became from remedying the present effects of past intentional 
discrimination, the more difficult such acceptance became. 
There is another aspect of the specific contexts in which the disparate 
impact theory arose that is worth highlighting.  Seniority systems and 
employment tests were specific practices that were easy to identify and for 
which there was no difficult causal question; the adverse impact of these 
practices was clear and all that was at issue were the employers’ attempts to 
justify the relevance, or legitimacy, of their practices.  The employers’ 
rationales were likewise relatively easy to define, and they were objective 
rather than subjective in nature.  Employers should have been able to 
explain the importance of a seniority system based on job titles or the need 
for a particular employment test, and to the extent that any were unable to 
do so in the face of clear and substantial disparate impact, one might question 
the employer’s motive in establishing or maintaining the practice.59  As 
soon as one moved away from these contexts, however, it became far more 
difficult to establish causation or a clear business justification conducive to 
objective proof.  The theory began to weaken and, ultimately, to dissolve.60 
                                                                                                                            
 58. See ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 73 (1993) (discussing the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) position seeking to avoid moral blame).  Professor Robert Belton has 
highlighted the role that the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund played in the early years 
of the theory.  See Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 936 (1978). 
 59. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1142 (1971) (“If [an employer] is fixing an irrelevant 
qualification which has a significant differential impact on black employment, he is discriminating 
on the basis of race.”).  This is similar to the point made many years ago by Professor George 
Rutherglen, and one with which I largely agree, although I will later suggest that the disparate impact 
theory was unnecessary to achieve this goal.  See Rutherglen, supra note 19, at 1311 (“The theory 
of disparate impact only addresses the difficulty of proving pretextual discrimination and of using 
objective evidence more clearly and systematically.”); discussion infra Part III.B. 
 60. There are other practices that courts typically treat as presumptively valid and 
therefore needing no justification, as discussed in more detail in the next section. 
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C. The Griggs Decision 
At the time it arose, the Griggs case fit easily within the developing 
case law.  However, it also offered a potentially more expansive theory of 
liability than the seniority cases because it was generally easier to confine 
the seniority cases to their particular context, while the testing cases could 
have had a broader application.  Prior to the passage of Title VII, the Duke 
Power Company (Duke Power) had intentionally segregated its workforce, 
restricting its African American employees to generally undesirable jobs 
within the labor department, including primarily outdoor maintenance and 
janitorial work.61  The highest pay within the labor department was lower 
than the starting pay in the other departments.62  In 1955, the company 
imposed a high school degree requirement for initial assignment to any 
department other than the labor department, and after Title VII became 
applicable, the employer required those seeking employment or transfers 
also to pass two written examinations.63  At the request of employees within 
the coal handling division, the employer subsequently allowed existing 
employees without high school degrees to transfer from the coal or labor 
departments by passing the two examinations.64  For both the high school 
degree and testing requirements, the company exempted incumbent 
employees, all of whom were white.65  Indeed, several of the white employees 
and five of the foremen did not have high school degrees, but they were all 
allowed to stay in their positions without taking the examinations.66  This 
fact proved crucial to the appellate court, which found the company liable 
for intentional discrimination on this basis and required that the black 
employees hired before the high school degree requirement was instituted 
be provided with the same exemption as the white employees.67  By the 
                                                                                                                            
 61. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1227–29 (4th Cir. 1970) (“Until 1966, no 
Negro had ever held a position at [the plant] in any department other than the Labor Department.”). 
 62. Id. at 1228.  The labor department had a maximum wage of $1.565 per hour while the 
minimum wage in other departments in the plant was $1.705 with a maximum of $3.18 to $3.65 
per hour.  Id. 
 63. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1971).  Although the tests likely 
would have had their greatest impact at the hiring stage, the class in Griggs consisted of existing 
employees, and the question with respect to applicants was never addressed.  It has been noted 
widely that the tests were instituted the day Title VII became effective, creating a presumption 
that they were instituted intentionally to disadvantage African Americans.  The high school 
degree requirement, however, was instituted nearly ten years earlier and actually had a greater 
effect on the black employees, only one of whom had a high school degree. 
 64. Id. at 428. 
 65. Id. at 427–28. 
 66. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 247 (M.D.N.C. 1968). 
 67. Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1231. 
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time the case reached the Supreme Court, only four of the original thirteen 
employees were seeking relief, and the defendants did not seek review from 
the appellate court’s finding of intentional discrimination. 
As was common at the time, Duke Power took no steps to determine 
whether the tests or the education requirement would actually ensure 
qualified employees but instead sought to justify the practices by asserting 
that the requirements would provide more educated—and by implication, 
better—employees.68  Some of the briefs filed in the Supreme Court 
included sample questions from the tests, and there was no obvious connec-
tion between the questions and the jobs at issue.69  The district court 
specifically noted that the test, widely used by employers at the time, was 
not job related in the sense that it would provide valuable information 
regarding the ability to perform job duties.  That court nevertheless held 
that the employer’s desire to upgrade the quality of its workforce was a valid 
business justification.70  From the cases and the briefs, it did not appear that 
Duke Power ever administered the test, but the EEOC had documented 
that whites typically fared three times better than African Americans on 
one of the tests the company sought to implement.71 
                                                                                                                            
 68. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (noting that both the tests and the high school degree 
requirement “were adopted . . . without meaningful study of their relationship to job-performance 
ability”).  The court of appeals explained the company’s justification as follows: “Duke claims that 
the policy was instituted because its business was becoming more complex, it had employees who 
were unable to grasp situations, to read, to reason, and who did not have an intelligence level high 
enough to enable them to progress upward through the company’s line of advancement.”  Griggs, 
420 F.2d at 1231. 
 69. The company used two commonly available tests, the Wonderlic Personnel Test and 
the Bennett Mechanical AA Test, and set the passing scores at the median for high school 
graduates.  The questions included in the briefs included comparisons of proverbs, sentence 
comprehension, and definitions: “Does B.C. mean ‘before Christ?’”  These questions prompted the 
Steelworkers, which filed a brief in support of the petitioners, to conclude, “These questions 
perhaps might have utility on a law school aptitude exam.  As a measure of ability to fill jobs in an 
industrial plant they are ludicrous.”  Brief for United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO as 
Amicus Curiae at 4, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 70-124).  In contrast, the employer highlighted 
some of what it deemed the more pertinent questions.  In a footnote it asked: 
Does it take “formal schooling” or “cultural background” to know that November is the 
eleventh month of the year (Question No. 1 [Wonderlic]), or that chew is related to 
teeth as smell is to nose (Question No. 7) or that if 3 lemons sell at 15 cents, one and 
one-half dozen would cost 90 cents (Question No. 12)? 
Brief for Respondent at 21 n.6, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (No. 70-124). 
 70. Griggs, 292 F. Supp. at 250 (noting that “[a] test which measures the level of general 
intelligence, but is unrelated to the job to be performed is just as reasonably a prerequisite to 
hiring or promotion as is a high school diploma”). 
 71. In a footnote, the Court observed that in one case, 58 percent of whites passed the tests 
in question, while only 6 percent of blacks passed.  Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.  The Court also 
noted that based on the 1960 census, within North Carolina, 34 percent of white males had 
completed high school compared to 12 percent of blacks.  Id. 
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The company’s explanation for the test, and its willingness to pay 
some of the education costs for those who sought to finish high school,72 
transformed the case, at least in the Supreme Court’s eyes, from one of 
intentional discrimination to something different.  There was no indication 
that the company adopted the requirements with the express purpose of 
confining African Americans to the labor department.  At the same time, there 
was little question of what the effect of the requirements would be: to 
exclude the vast majority of African Americans and thereby to preserve the 
segregated job lines within the company.  Importantly, all of the courts to 
analyze the issue accepted the company’s stated explanation of a desire to 
upgrade the quality of its workforce at face value.  This was true even 
though the test had not been shown to provide reliable information regard-
ing the necessary skills for the positions, and even though the controversy 
over standardized tests was not a new one.  The United States government 
had suspended the administration of a widely used occupational test in 1963 
out of concern for its adverse effect on minorities; and in 1968 the NAACP 
called for a moratorium on standardized tests.73  Thus, the Court in Griggs 
confronted the same question as the Papermakers case: Were ostensibly neu-
tral practices that perpetuated intentional discrimination permissible under 
the new statute? 
Many commentators have analyzed the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Griggs,74 but this Article focuses on those aspects of the case that best shed 
light on the theory’s origins and future development.  I have already noted 
                                                                                                                            
 72. Id. at 432 (“The Company’s lack of discriminatory intent is suggested by special efforts 
to help the undereducated employees through Company financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition 
for high school training.”). 
 73. See Edmund W. Gordon & Tresmaine J. Rubain, Bias and Alternatives in Psychological 
Testing, 49 J. NEGRO EDUC. 350, 359 (1980) (noting that the NAACP and other organizations 
had called for a moratorium on standardized tests in 1968 due to their effect on minority test 
takers); Neil Lawler, Developing New Employment Tests for Minorities, PUBLIC ADMIN. REV., July–
Aug. 1971, at 459, 460 (explaining that the U.S. Training and Employment Service determined 
in 1963 that the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB) was inappropriate for use on minorities).  
One of the most important articles on discrimination in tests was also published at about this same 
time.  See T. Anne Cleary, Test Bias: Prediction of Grades of Negro and White Students in Integrated 
Colleges, 5 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 115 (1968).  It is worth reemphasizing that until the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, lawful discrimination preempted many of these concerns. 
 74. See, e.g., JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND 
OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 412–20 (1994); Herbert N. 
Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Implications for Private and Public Employers, 50 TEX. L. 
REV. 901 (1972); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the 
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Mack A. Player, Is Griggs 
Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1989); 
Hugh Steven Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations on Job 
Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844 (1972). 
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that Duke Power had a long history of segregated job lines and the results of 
its practices were highly predictable.  An equally important aspect of the 
case was the historical timeframe in which it arose.  By 1971, the Supreme 
Court had confronted many evasive state and private practices in voting, 
education, and, to a lesser extent, housing.  The Court was well aware of the 
vast and persistent means by which civil rights mandates could be frustrated.75  
All of the briefs that were filed in support of the employees relied on those 
earlier cases to emphasize that unvalidated tests could readily be used to 
evade the purpose of Title VII.76  While Griggs was the Court’s first explora-
tion of potentially evasive practices in the employment context, the Court’s 
past experience undeniably influenced its perspective in interpreting Title 
VII.  The Court referenced its decisions in the other contexts as support for 
invalidating the employer’s practices.77  Equally revealing, during the same 
                                                                                                                            
 75. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating a city charter that had 
overridden fair housing ordinance); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating 
freedom of choice plans); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating a state housing 
referendum designed to provide local control over fair housing); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating a state poll tax); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) 
(holding unconstitutional a county’s decision to close the schools); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 
(1953) (holding unconstitutional the transfer of state primaries to a private discriminatory body); 
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding unconstitutional a state democratic party’s all-
white primaries). 
 76. For example, petitioner Griggs argued:  
The use of tests and educational requirements is but one example of a new breed of racial 
discrimination.  While outright and open exclusion of Negroes is passé, the use of various 
forms of neutral, objective criteria which systematically reduce Negro job opportunity are 
producing much the same result.  As this Court has long recognized in other contexts of 
racial discrimination, those rules which are objective and neutral in form may well be 
racially discriminatory in substance and effect. 
Brief for Petitioner at 25, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 70-124).  In support of its argument, the 
petitioner cited cases involving grandfather clauses, tuition grants, and gerrymandering.  The 
United States, as amicus curiae, cited the grandfather clause and literacy test cases early in its 
brief.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12–13, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 70-124); 
see also Brief of the Attorney General of the State of New York as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Reversal at 9, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 70-124) (“Duke’s transfer requirements are analogous in their 
invidious effects upon Negroes to other practices in civil rights contexts which have been stricken 
down by the Courts.”); Brief for United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, 
supra note 69, at 4 (noting that the lower court’s interpretation would “cripple Title VII”). 
 77. The Court cited the voting rights case Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), 
explaining that “[t]here, because of the inferior education received by Negroes in North Carolina, 
this Court barred the institution of a literacy test for voter registration on the ground that the test 
would abridge the right to vote indirectly on account of race.”  Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.  The 
dissenting opinion in the court of appeals was even more explicit in connecting the past civil 
rights cases to the employment setting, citing grandfather clauses, pupil transfer plans, and other 
cases to support its claim that “[o]vert bias, when prohibited, has ofttimes been supplanted by 
more cunning devices designed to impart the appearance of neutrality, but to operate with the 
same invidious effect as before.”  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1238 (4th Cir. 1970) 
(Sobeloff, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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term that Griggs was decided, the Supreme Court also approved busing as a 
remedy for desegregation78 and addressed the difficult question of defining 
legislative motive, a close cousin of intent, in the closing of swimming pools 
in Jackson, Mississippi.79  In other words, while it was early in the 
development of the Court’s employment discrimination doctrine, there was 
a substantial history that informed the Court’s decision as to what kinds of 
practices were discriminatory.  Importantly, to the extent that the Court 
had focused on the issue, the earlier civil rights cases were all decided under 
a theory of intentional discrimination.80 
Placed in context, the Court’s unanimous decision in Griggs was nei-
ther particularly difficult nor far reaching.  Permitting the tests and degree 
requirement without any justification other than a vague desire to improve 
the quality of the workforce effectively would have preserved the segregated 
job lines that Title VII was intended to eradicate.  Any similar practice 
likewise would have been insulated from challenge, and the Court was 
unlikely to turn its back on the purpose of Title VII in the first case it con-
fronted on the merits of that statute.  By the same measure, the Court 
avoided broad proclamations by offering a short and undertheorized deci-
sion that traversed a middle ground.81  Rather than defining the employers’ 
practices as intentional discrimination, the Court allowed employers to use 
selection methods despite their adverse impact so long as they were 
demonstrated to be job related.82  The Chamber of Commerce had staked 
                                                                                                                            
 78. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 79. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).  The Palmer case has always been a bit of a 
curiosity, and while arguably consistent with Griggs in avoiding a focus on legislative motive, it proved 
inconsistent with the Court’s later determination that intent was a necessary element of equal 
protection claims.  For an influential critique of the case, see Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An 
Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95.  It is worth noting that 
it would still be two years before the Court took up what would become the most common proof 
structure in employment discrimination cases involving claims of disparate treatment.  See 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing a three-part proof 
structure to prove individual claims of intent). 
 80. This became clear in Washington v. Davis, where the Court held that intent was a 
requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.  Many of the earlier cases—and all of the education 
cases—also were decided under that clause.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–43 (1976). 
 81. This was a common feature of the Court’s race discrimination cases at the time, where 
the Court wrote short, often unanimous, decisions to invalidate particular practices without 
developing a broader theory.  See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (invalidating a 
multimember voting district based on the totality of the circumstances); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 
385 (1969) (invalidating a housing ordinance because it burdened racial minorities).  I have 
previously discussed these cases in Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of 
Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 299–301 (1997). 
 82. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (“The touchstone is business necessity.  If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the 
practice is prohibited.”). 
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out a largely similar position in support of Duke Power.  The disagreement 
between its position and the Court’s was over whether the employer had a 
valid business justification for the challenged practices.83  Thus Griggs is 
properly seen as a norms-reinforcing decision rather than a broad or different 
interpretation of equality that challenged the status quo.84  The Court 
upheld an employer’s right to establish efficient business practices even if 
that meant excluding African Americans and, later, women, but it required 
employers to come forward with some justification for doing so.  At this 
point the Court had not yet established the governing standards for what 
those acceptable business justifications might be.85 
Another important aspect of the Griggs case is that the proposition for 
which the case is now best known—proof of intent is not necessary to 
establish a violation under Title VII—was not a central part of the case.  
All three published opinions, and all of the briefs filed in the Supreme 
Court, included surprisingly little discussion regarding whether intent was a 
required element of proof.  There was no discussion of the legislative history 
as it applied to the intent requirement.  Rather, the Court extensively 
explored Title VII’s legislative history to determine the meaning of 
§ 703(h), the so-called Tower Amendment that insulated “professionally 
developed” tests from challenge.86  The principal § 703(h) issue was 
whether professionally developed meant “job related” or simply “any test,” 
irrespective of whether the test provided valuable information regarding 
                                                                                                                            
 83. See Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
of America at 5, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 70-124) (noting that a discriminatory “intent may 
exist, where . . . there is an absence of ‘legitimate business needs’ which justified the employer’s 
utilization of such educational or test requirements” but questioning what a “legitimate business 
need” might constitute).  Even the employer emphasized the validity of its justification rather 
than arguing that it did not need a justification.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 69, at 13–17. 
 84. One reason the Court may have staked out the middle ground was the presence of a 
deep irony lurking in the background of the case.  Prior to the advent of written tests for the 
workplace, subjective employment practices were widely thought to be discriminatory, and 
objective practices were seen as a potential antidote.  Several courts had, in fact, found subjective 
practices to be inherently discriminatory.  See Albert J. Rosenthal, Employment Discrimination and 
the Law, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 91, 95 (1973) (discussing cases). 
 85. The Court provided substance to those standards several years later in the case of 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), discussed infra at notes 95–98. 
 86. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433 (“The Company contends that its general intelligence tests 
are specifically permitted by § 703(h) of the Act.  That section authorizes the use of ‘any 
professionally developed ability test’ that is not ‘designed, intended, or used to discriminate 
because of race . . . .’”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1233 (4th Cir. 1970) (“Next, 
we consider the testing requirements to determine their validity and we conclude that they . . . are 
valid under § 703(h) . . . .”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 249–50 (M.D.N.C. 
1968) (upholding tests as consistent with § 703(h)). 
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one’s ability to perform a particular job.87  To the extent that there was 
discussion regarding intent, particularly in the lower courts, unvalidated 
tests were equated with intentional discrimination.88  This position was 
consistent with the state of the doctrine at the time, as courts were primar-
ily seeking to determine what practices violated Title VII without thinking 
more broadly about an underlying theory.  In the words of Robert Belton, 
one of the attorneys for Griggs, “It was all discrimination.”89 
This interpretation of Griggs was apparent from the reactions to the 
decision both within the media and among scholars.  Immediately following 
the decision, the commentary focused almost exclusively on the require-
ments for validating written tests—and there was no indication that the 
case had spawned a new theory of liability.90  Similarly, the vast majority of 
the cases that succeeded after Griggs followed the same pattern: Southern 
employers with a history of intentional discrimination utilizing unvalidated 
tests, most of which were implemented after the passage of Title VII, which 
had a clear and predictable exclusionary effect on black employees and 
                                                                                                                            
 87. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433–34 (upholding EEOC’s interpretation that § 703(h) 
permits only job related tests).  The district court, on the other hand, concluded that the tests 
only had to be professionally developed: “A test which measures the level of general intelligence, but 
is unrelated to the job to be performed is just as reasonably a prerequisite to hiring or promotion as 
is a high school diploma.”  Griggs, 292 F. Supp. at 250.  The district court saw no basis for 
challenging the high school degree requirement and, by analogy, upheld the testing requirement 
as well.  Id. 
 88. The only substantial discussion of intent came from the dissenting judge in the court of 
appeals who wrote:  
Distilled to its essence, the underpinning upon which my brethren posit their 
argument is their expressed belief in the good faith of Duke Power.  For them, the crucial 
inquiry is not whether the Company can establish business need, but whether it has a 
bad motive or has designed its tests with the conscious purpose to discriminate against 
blacks . . . . But this is no[ ] answer. 
A man who is turned down for a job does not care whether it was because the 
employer did not like his skin color or because, although the employer professed 
impartiality, procedures were used which had the effect of discriminating against the 
applicant’s race. 
Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1245–46 (Sobeloff, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Interestingly, his language parallels what came to be the dominant interpretation of the disparate 
impact provision. 
 89. Conversation with Robert Belton, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School (Jan. 6, 2004). 
 90. See Bernhardt, supra note 74, at 918–20 (treating Griggs as a case about testing); 
Wilson, supra note 74 (discussing tests and suggesting that courts should be sensitive to costs in the 
business necessity calculation).  For journalist reports, see Stanley Klein, Job Testing Comes Under 
Fire: Too Many Disqualify Minority Applicants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1971, at F5 (discussing the 
impact of the Griggs decision on employment testing); Job Tests Held in Violation of Rights Act,  
WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1971, at A1. 
724 53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 701 (2006) 
 
applicants.91  There were a number of exceptions to this rule that began to 
stretch the disparate impact theory into other areas, including height and 
weight requirements, which had an adverse impact against women and 
Latinos, and arrest records, which tended to have an adverse impact on 
blacks.92  Importantly, even at this early juncture, when employers had 
legitimate justifications for their practices, courts did not hesitate to accept 
them.93  Far more commonly, however, the challenged practices were 
imposed, as in Griggs, without any significant validation or justification.94 
                                                                                                                            
 91. See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Labs., 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1978) (invalidating the 
twelfth-grade education requirement of a Mississippi employer as not justified by business 
necessity); Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1976) (invalidating education 
and testing practices for an Alabama company with a history of discrimination); Rogers v. Int’l 
Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975) (sustaining a disparate impact challenge for failure to 
meet minimum validation standards for an Arkansas company where 1/160 supervisors were 
black), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 526 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1975); 
Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974) (invalidating practices that 
perpetuated the effects of past intentional discrimination); Sims v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l 
Ass’n, Local Union No. 65, 489 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1973) (striking down a testing practice 
instituted after Title VII became law); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 
1973) (holding that pre-Act discrimination rendered a seniority system discriminatory); United 
States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding the defendant’s 
past history of discrimination relevant to invalidating current seniority practices); Rowe v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 1972) (invalidating promotion and transfer practices by an 
Atlanta plant with a history of discrimination where practices “froze” the status quo); United 
States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971) (invalidating seniority and 
transfer practices for a Jacksonville, Florida company with a history of exclusionary practices); 
Robinson v. Lorrillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971) (invalidating a department seniority 
practice because of perpetuated discrimination). 
 92. See Smith v. Olin Chem. Corp., 535 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1976) (challenging a discharge 
for sickle cell anemia); Green v. Mo. Pacific R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(invalidating an employer’s practice of refusing to hire applicants with convictions other than 
minor traffic offenses as inconsistent with business necessity); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 
(8th Cir. 1974) (challenging a company policy discharging employees whose wages were garnished 
and remanding for determination of business necessity). 
 93. See, e.g., White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1977) (finding 
that an employer’s practices satisfied the business necessity test because the jobs required special 
skills); Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977) (upholding a no-spouse 
rule as job related despite its adverse impact against women); Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50 
(8th Cir. 1977) (upholding a pilot height requirement as relevant to operation within the 
cockpit); Allen v. City of Mobile, 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972) (police department tests); 
Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 228 (D. Colo. 1971) (upholding a college degree 
requirement as related to the training program). 
 94. See Walston v. County Sch. Bd., 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974) (invalidating a teacher 
examination in a Virginia school district as part of a desegregation order); United States v. Ga. 
Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973) (invalidating tests that were implemented after the end 
of formal segregation and where no validation was attempted until after suit was filed); Young v. Edgcomb 
Steel Co., 363 F. Supp. 961 (M.D.N.C. 1973) (invalidating the use of the Wonderlic test as not 
validated), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 499 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1974). 
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D. Washington v. Davis and the Turn to Intent 
The question of employment testing returned to the Supreme Court 
just a few years later in a case that also arose from North Carolina and that 
involved the same test that was at issue in Griggs.95  Albemarle Paper, now 
known primarily as one of the most frequently misspelled cases,96 greatly 
expanded the requirements for validating written examinations, and, in 
many ways, was far more important than Griggs in defining the standards 
employers had to meet to comply with Title VII.97  At the same time, 
Albemarle Paper was strictly a testing case insofar as the validation require-
ments it established were applicable only to written examinations.98 
The real watershed case arrived the following year in Washington v. 
Davis,99 a case that in many ways paralleled the issues raised in Griggs, but 
by a quirk of timing, was pursued as a constitutional rather than a statutory 
claim.  Davis involved a challenge to a written test developed by the federal 
government for use by the civil service commission and administered by the 
Washington, D.C. Police Department.  The test had a significant adverse 
impact on African Americans, who failed at a rate approximately four times 
higher than that for whites.100  Despite the test’s adverse impact, the Department 
had greater success in its actual hiring, in large part because in some years as 
many as 70 percent of its applicants were African American.101  At the time 
the case reached the Supreme Court, nearly half of the new police recruits, 
                                                                                                                            
 95. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
 96. For whatever reason, Albemarle is routinely spelled “Albermarle.”  Runner-up in the mis-
spelling category is Atonio of the Wards Cove case, which spellcheckers frequently correct to “Antonio.” 
 97. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 427–36.  Some commentators interpreted Albemarle as a serious 
restriction on employment testing.  For a somewhat hyperbolic account, see James G. Johnson, 
Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody: The Aftermath of Griggs and the Death of Employee Testing, 
27 HASTINGS L.J. 1239 (1976) (arguing that the EEOC standards relied on by the Albemarle 
Court were too stringent and unworkable). 
 98. The EEOC guidelines, adopted in Albemarle, established three means by which written 
tests could be validated, and those guidelines continue to focus exclusively on written 
examinations.  See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 
(2004).  Originally issued in 1966, the guidelines were last revised in 1978.  For a thorough 
analysis of the guidelines and the different means of validation, see Gillespie v. Wisconsin, 771 F.2d 
1035 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 99. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 100. Between 1968 and 1971, 57 percent of black applicants failed the test while only 13 percent 
of whites failed.  See Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958–59 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 101. Between 1968 and 1971, the pool fluctuated from a high of 70.3 percent black 
applicants (1969) to 52.1 percent (1970), with an overall percentage of 58.4 percent.  Brief for 
Respondent at 5 n.8, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (No. 74-1492).  During the same 
time period, 42.5 percent of the hires were black.  Id.; see also Davis, 512 F.2d at 961 n.32. 
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and 35 percent of the entire force, were African Americans.102  
Foreshadowing a future debate, the Department defended its use of the test 
by arguing that its aggressive recruitment efforts had resulted in a police 
department that was representative of the relevant labor market, an issue 
the court of appeals rejected and the Supreme Court ignored.103  It was also 
significant that at the time the case arose, police departments were a 
particular focus of integration efforts as a result of the Kerner Commission 
Report, issued after the 1968 riots that had ravaged many cities, including 
Washington, D.C.104  One of the central conclusions of the Kerner 
Commission was that police departments required more minority members 
in order to more effectively police urban cities.105  Adding to the complexity 
of the case, Washington, D.C. was a majority black city with a progressive 
black mayor, and the United States was a defendant in the case even while 
it was the chief enforcer of Title VII.106 
The challenge in Washington v. Davis was filed in 1970, but because 
Title VII did not become applicable to public employers until 1972 the case was 
brought under the Constitution, and the plaintiffs sought to import the 
standards developed in Griggs into the Equal Protection Clause.107  The idea 
of applying Title VII principles to the Equal Protection Clause may seem 
radical today.  However, at the time, it was the prevailing judicial approach.  
Both of the lower courts had, in fact, applied the Title VII standards with-
out significant analysis, as had been true of many lower courts, and the issue 
                                                                                                                            
 102. Brief for Respondent, supra note 101, at 22 n.29 (noting that 36.5 percent of the police 
force was black).  The Supreme Court noted that “[s]ince August 1969, 44% of the new police 
force recruits had been black. . . .”  Davis, 426 U.S. at 235.  The court of appeals stated that 55 percent 
of all new officers reporting for the academy were black.  Davis, 512 F.2d at 961 n.32. 
 103. See Brief for Petitioners at 14–18, Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (No. 74-1492) (arguing that the 
test did not have an adverse impact because the department’s overall numbers were consistent 
with representation from the recruitment pool).  This emphasis on the “bottom line” was 
subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court.  See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
 104. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).  
The Kerner Commission Report has been the subject of extensive scholarly commentary.  See, 
e.g., John O. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-the-Future 
Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487 (1993). 
 105. See Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law 
and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 690 (2004) (noting that the 
Kerner Commission “[R]eport urged more efforts to recruit more African Americans, and those 
officers ‘should be so assigned as to ensure that the police department is fully and visibly 
integrated’”).  The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 
issued a report in 1973 calling for explicit hiring goals and suggesting elimination of all entrance 
requirements other than those necessary to police work.  See id. at 690–91. 
 106. For a discussion of Washington, D.C. and its politics at the time, see Philip G. Schrag, By 
the People: The Political Dynamics of a Constitutional Convention, 72 GEO. L.J. 819, 829–31 (1984). 
 107. Davis, 426 U.S. at 232–33, 236 n.6. 
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was barely addressed in the Supreme Court briefs.108  Nevertheless, by 1976, 
the disparate impact theory had acquired a different meaning than origi-
nally articulated in Griggs, and the Supreme Court now faced a potentially 
far more expansive theory that could have prompted a significant amount of 
litigation and social restructuring.  Many lower courts and some scholars 
had seized on the theory as a broad tool for social reform in housing, munici-
pal services, and other areas.109  Civil rights issues also had taken a different turn.  
The busing controversy had erupted throughout the country, and the 
images of the Boston melee were still fresh in everyone’s mind.110  And 
while the Court had approved busing as a desegregation remedy during the 
same term as its Griggs decision, Washington v. Davis followed shortly after 
the Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley prohibiting desegregation efforts 
that crossed district lines, a decision many advocates viewed as effectively 
ending serious hope of meaningful desegregation.111  Between Griggs and 
Davis, the Court also had its first taste of affirmative action, rejected a 
challenge to unequal funding of schools, addressed school desegregation in a 
Northern school system, and balanced seniority rights against the 
                                                                                                                            
 108. The respondent’s brief addressed the issue of the constitutional standard in a footnote.  
Brief for Respondent, supra note 101, at 23 n.35.  Equal protection cases that applied the statutory 
standard included Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding that the Constitution 
requires no less than Title VII); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972) (a 
challenge to a competitive examination for school supervisory positions); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 
315 (8th Cir. 1971) (Minneapolis fire department challenge); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. 
Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973) (§ 1981 and equal protection challenges to a fire department test), modified 
and aff’d sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. O’Neill, 348 F. 
Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (challenge to a Philadelphia police test), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 473 F.3d 
1029 (3d Cir. 1973); and Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 306 F. Supp. 
1355 (D. Mass. 1969) (a constitutional challenge to the GATB test). 
 109. See, e.g., Coal. for Educ. v. Bd. of Elections, 370 F. Supp. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (a voting 
rights challenge); Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. City of Cleveland, 342 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. 
Ohio 1972) (a challenge to a zoning requirement), aff’d, 474 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1973); see also 
William Silverman, Equal Protection, Economic Legislation, and Racial Discrimination, 25 VAND. L. 
REV. 1183 (1972) (arguing that the disparate impact theory could invalidate minimum wage and 
usury laws and preferential licensing). 
 110. The riots that broke out over the school desegregation order requiring busing in Boston 
occurred in 1974–75.  See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DESEGREGATING THE BOSTON 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A CRISIS IN CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY (1975).  The episode has been chronicled 
wonderfully in Eyes on the Prize: American’s Civil Rights Years (PBS television broadcast 1987) and 
in J. ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND (1985). 
 111. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).  The Milliken case has been widely 
denounced as one of the most restrictive cases involving school desegregation.  See, e.g., GARY 
ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 10–11 (1996) (claiming that school desegregation “hit a stone 
wall” with Milliken); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of 
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1518 (2005) (noting that Milliken “effectively 
foreclosed the possibility of integrated schooling in the central cities”). 
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antidiscrimination mandate, all of which may have awakened the Court to 
the complexities of equality under an expansive interpretation of the 
disparate impact theory.112  Moreover, in the particular context of the Davis 
case, the constitutional question was wholly unnecessary, as any challenge 
to public employment practices could now be brought under Title VII.  
These factors surely contributed to the Court’s decision to exclude effects 
claims from the scope of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Although Washington v. Davis has been canonized for holding that 
intent is an element of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court’s discussion 
of the test, and the way that discussion diverged from its analysis in Griggs, 
is equally important to understanding the meaning of the disparate impact 
theory, and this point too often is missed by those who cling to the power of 
the theory.  Central to the Court’s holding was a normative judgment that 
the administration of the test challenged in Davis was not properly defined 
as discrimination—intentional or otherwise.  In the last part of its opinion, 
the Court, in fact, upheld the test under the standards applicable to Title 
VII, and did so in a way that was remarkably different in tone and substance 
from the Court’s earlier decision in Griggs.113  Although the test at issue in 
Davis was similar to that in Griggs in its structure, primarily an SAT-style 
test, it had been created by the federal government and validated for use 
based on the Washington, D.C. Police Department’s training program.114  
Moreover, although Washington, D.C. was nominally a Southern city, it 
was one without a deep history of civil rights resistance, and in light of the 
city’s recruitment efforts and the presence of a black mayor, it would have 
                                                                                                                            
 112. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (considering seniority 
rights issued under Title VII); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (dismissing an 
affirmative action case as moot); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (discussing de facto 
and de jure discrimination in the Denver school system); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a state education 
funding system). 
 113. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 249–50 (1976) (noting that the district court 
“assumed that Title VII standards were to control the case” and upholding the job-relatedness of 
the test). 
 114. Id. at 251 (noting that “[t]he District Court’s . . . conclusion that Test 21 was in fact 
directly related to the requirements of the police training program was supported by a validation 
study, as well as by other evidence of record . . . .”).  A copy of the test was attached as an 
appendix to the appellate court decision by the dissenting judge.  See Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 
956, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  There were eighty questions and a score of forty was necessary to pass.  
The test was designed to measure verbal ability, and most of the questions asked variations on 
reading comprehension or vocabulary.  To give one example, Question Eighty asked: “The saying 
‘Anger dies quickly with a great man’ means most nearly A) A good man is slow to anger.  B) Nothing 
ruffles a good disposition.  C) One can forgive but not forget.  D) Strong passions cannot last.  E) 
To continue to bear malice is petty.”  Id. at 976. 
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been difficult to suggest that the city was using the test with an intent to 
exclude African Americans from its force. 115  As a result, and in direct con-
trast to its analysis in Griggs, the Court did not see the administration of the 
test as discriminatory, specifically commenting: “[W]e have difficulty under-
standing how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification for employ-
ment is nevertheless racially discriminatory . . . simply because a greater 
proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic 
groups.”116  The Court concluded: “[I]t is untenable that the Constitution 
prevents the Government from seeking modestly to upgrade the communi-
cative abilities of its employees rather than to be satisfied with some lower 
level of competence, particularly where the job requires special ability to 
communicate orally and in writing.”117 
These statements were directly contrary to those made in Griggs.  
Although it might be tempting to see the distinction in the case as turning 
on the difference in jobs—police compared to power plant workers—there 
is little basis for this distinction in the case.118  In Davis, there were no find-
ings on the importance of the verbal abilities of police officers, nor was 
there any indication that this particular test sought the requisite verbal 
abilities necessary to read manuals or communicate effectively with the 
public, presumably the primary basis for the requirement.  Rather, the test 
had been validated against a written examination administered at the end 
of the training academy, a process the appellate court had dismissed as 
demonstrating little more than a correlation between success on written 
examinations.119  Whether the test had been properly validated was the 
                                                                                                                            
 115. Davis, 426 U.S. at 235.  The Court later referenced the Department’s successful 
recruiting efforts in summarily rejecting an intentional discrimination allegation:  
[W]e think the District Court correctly held that the affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan 
Police Department to recruit black officers, the changing racial composition of the recruit 
classes and of the force in general, and the relationship of the test to the training program 
negated any inference that the Department discriminated on the basis of race . . . . 
Id. at 246.  In their brief in the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs disputed the city’s recruitment 
efforts, noting that the city’s nationwide recruitment led to a sharp increase in white applicants.  
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 101, at 4–5.  The district court, however, had concluded, 
“The Metropolitan Police Department is a model nationwide for its success in bridging racial 
barriers.”  Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 116. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245. 
 117. Id. at 245–46. 
 118. For an interpretation that relies heavily on a distinction in the job duties, see Barbara 
Lerner, Washington v. Davis: Quantity, Quality and Equality in Employment Testing, 1976 SUP. CT. 
REV. 263, 279–82. 
 119. See Davis, 512 F.2d at 962–64.  One problem with the validation effort is that the test 
administered at the end of the training program had not been shown to be related to the actual 
qualities of a successful police officer, and without more, there was a possibility that the test 
simply indicated which applicants performed well on written examinations. 
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primary issue raised in the Supreme Court briefs.120  Moreover, some of the 
power plant jobs at issue in Griggs also involved potentially dangerous and 
complex work, and the employer had argued that its tests were necessary to 
ensure its employees had the ability to progress to those higher level jobs.121  
Rather than focusing on the distinction in job duties, something else 
appeared to have shifted on the Court, as within the Washington, D.C. 
police force, the Court did not see the use of the test as discriminatory. 
The factual difference in the cases also highlights an important 
unasked question: Why should Washington, D.C. have been liable for 
administering the test?  This is a question that has rarely been addressed by 
those advocating an expansion of disparate impact liability, but one that 
goes to the core of the theory while also exposing its limits.  In Griggs, it was 
relatively easy to make the moral case for liability given the company’s 
history of discrimination and the way the tests perpetuated that past dis-
crimination without providing clear information relevant to the employer’s 
business interests.  But in Davis, the link was far less clear.  The test at issue 
in Davis was used throughout the civil service system, and the city’s recruit-
ment efforts did not suggest a desire to exclude African Americans.122  The 
success of the Department’s hiring practices also made this a difficult case, 
because, for practical purposes, the plaintiffs were arguing that 70 percent of 
the new recruits should have been black rather than 50 percent.  By any measure 
this was a difficult argument to sell.123  As in Griggs, there was a high 
probability that the Department’s test would have an adverse effect on 
black applicants, but there was also reason to believe the city would take 
steps to mitigate that harm.  Just the opposite appeared true with Duke 
                                                                                                                            
 120. The questions presented involved the test’s adverse impact and whether the test had 
been properly validated.  Testing organizations also weighed in on the case, whereas they were 
absent from Griggs.  See Brief of American Society for Personnel Administration as Amicus 
Curiae, Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (No. 74-1492); Brief of the Executive Committee of the Division of 
Industrial Organizational Psychology (Division 14) of the American Psychological Ass’n as Amicus 
Curiae, Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (No. 74-1492); Brief of Educational Testing Service as Amicus Curiae, 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (No. 74-1492). 
 121. The Fourth Circuit explained: “Duke claims that the policy was instituted because its 
business was becoming more complex, it had employees who were unable to grasp situations, to read, 
to reason, and who did not have an intelligence level high enough to enable them to progress 
upward through the company’s line of advancement.”  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 
1231 (4th Cir. 1970). 
 122. See Lerner, supra note 118, at 271–72 (emphasizing the city’s recruitment efforts). 
 123. The court of appeals signed on, however, noting specifically: “Although the 
Department, quite commendably, has succeeded in increasing the proportion of black officers 
through vigorous efforts, it is self-evident that use of selection procedures that do not have a disparate 
effect on blacks would have resulted in an even greater percentage of black officers than exists 
today.”  Davis, 512 F.2d at 961 (footnote omitted). 
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Power, which did not appear opposed to the results of its employment prac-
tices.124  One might have advanced the theory articulated by Professor 
Blumrosen and others that liability should attach based on the torts 
standard of knowledge of the probable effects of the city’s acts, but that 
would have been a significant expansion into a negligence theory of liabil-
ity, an expansion rejected, at least implicitly, in Griggs. 
Two other liability rationales were possible.  Assuming the differential 
success rates on the test were attributable to the deficient education that 
Washington, D.C. provided to African Americans in its segregated schools, 
one might argue that the city was now required to take remedial steps so 
that its prior discrimination in the schools did not lead to a legacy of workplace 
discrimination in the future.125  To my mind, this theory presents the 
strongest basis for holding the city liable, but it was not a theory advanced 
or even referenced by any of the parties that filed briefs in the case.  One 
might also assert a more general theory independent of discrimination 
within the schools to suggest that the city had an obligation to remedy past 
discrimination that rendered African Americans less prepared for written 
tests.  If developed, this theory would have imposed an affirmative action 
obligation on the city to remedy what has come to be defined as societal 
discrimination, and although also a solid basis for holding the city liable, 
this argument would have extended the disparate impact theory well past its 
moorings.126  In the end, no adequate theory justifying liability against the 
city of Washington, D.C. was advanced; indeed, no theory was advanced at 
all.  Instead, the parties focused on whether the Department had satisfied 
the statutory requirements of Title VII.127 
                                                                                                                            
 124. The city emphasized this point in its brief: “[I]t is indeed manifest that Test 21 does not 
operate to lock in a prior practice of discrimination, to freeze a racially unacceptable status quo, or 
to perpetuate or carry forward a racially tainted hiring practice of yesteryear.”  Brief for Petitioner, 
supra note 103, at 16.  The brief also sought to distinguish the situation in Griggs by noting that 
Duke Power had instituted its test the day Title VII became applicable and did so without 
meaningful study.  Id. at 17. 
 125. While the majority of black applicants were from Washington, D.C., many were from 
outside the city.  In fact, one of the issues raised in the briefs involved what the proper labor 
market should be for comparison purposes.  The city argued that it recruited primarily from a fifty-
mile radius of the city, where the population of young black men was 36.5 percent, nearly exactly 
the percentage of black officers on the force.  See Reply Brief of the United States at 4, Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (No. 74-1492). 
 126. I have discussed the link between the disparate impact theory and societal discrimination 
previously.  See Michael Selmi, Remedying Societal Discrimination Through the Spending Power,  
80 N.C. L. REV. 1575, 1601–03 (2002). 
 127. Subsequently, in critiquing the Court’s decision, a number of scholars provided strong 
rationales.  See Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 51–52 (1977) (arguing that tests with disparate impact reinforce the “stigma of caste”); 
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The Supreme Court, however, needed more than a statutory argument 
to impose liability in this particular circumstance, and I suggest below that 
one reason the disparate impact theory has failed to produce greater results 
is precisely because no argument was developed to explain why the theory 
was consistent with the commitment to equality—why Washington, D.C. 
should have been held liable for the discriminatory results of the test rather 
than whether proof of intent was necessary either under the Constitution or 
Title VII.  This failure to develop a theory, grounded in continuing dis-
crimination, helps explain more generally why antidiscrimination law has 
had such a limited scope.128 
Any doubt that Washington v. Davis was a limitation on the disparate 
impact theory was soon put to rest in the cases that followed.  In Dothard v. 
Rawlinson,129 the Supreme Court permitted a disparate impact challenge, brought 
                                                                                                                            
Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 
540, 558 (1977) (“The underlying cause of disproportionate racial impact, the especially 
disadvantaged social position of black Americans, is one for which American society and 
government bear a heavy moral responsibility.”).  In an earlier article, Owen Fiss had set forth a 
theory including disparate effects in his equal achievement perspective.  See Owen M. Fiss, A 
Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971). 
 128. At least two other theories or arguments were available.  Consistent with the doctrine 
developed in the Albemarle Paper case, the plaintiffs might have offered alternative selection 
devices that would satisfy the department’s needs while having a less adverse impact.  As the case 
proceeded, no alternative was offered, but a typical alternative would be to lower the cut-off score.  
When a reasonable alternative is offered, and the employer declines to adopt it, it seems 
reasonable to infer discrimination from its acts because there would no longer be any business 
justification.  This is an inference that is now part of the formal proof structure arising from the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
The plaintiffs also might have sought to demonstrate that the test was culturally biased in 
that the test questions favored white applicants and were less likely to be familiar to black 
applicants.  My sense is that this is the most common objection to written tests, but it turns out to 
be a difficult claim to establish.  Depending on the test, it might be possible to show that certain 
test questions favor white applicants either due to cultural or educational differences, and that 
might have been true at the time.  These claims, however, frequently run aground in 
professionally developed tests, particularly with more recent tests that are designed with an eye to 
avoiding cultural bias.  A more difficult issue is that there is little empirical support for the notion 
that the tests underpredict the performance of minority candidates, which would be a strong sign 
of test bias.  See Sackett et al., supra note 15, at 303 (“An extensive body of research in both the 
employment and education literatures has demonstrated that these tests generally do not exhibit 
predictive bias.”).  If the test were biased, one would expect African American employees to do 
better on the job than their test scores predict, but in most studies, the opposite has proved true.  In the 
last decade, psychologist Claude Steele and others have developed a theory known as stereotype 
threat which suggests that a concern with confirming stereotypes leads minority students to 
underperform on certain examinations.  See, e.g., Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How 
Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613 (1997); Claude M. 
Steele, Thin Ice: “Stereotype Threat” and Black College Students, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1999, 
at 44, 48.  This is a complicated and controversial theory that has not yet been shown to apply 
outside of the academic context. 
 129. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).   
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by women, to height and weight requirements for correctional officer 
positions in a male prison.130  Yet, while permitting the challenge, the 
Supreme Court also upheld the specific gender restrictions as a bona fide 
occupational qualification, negating the disparate impact finding and cre-
ating the curious result that what the employer was prohibited from doing 
indirectly it could accomplish directly.131  Two years later the Court rejected 
a challenge to the New York City Transit Authority’s policy of refusing to 
employ individuals who were receiving methadone treatment, which the 
plaintiffs alleged had a disparate impact against African Americans, who 
were disproportionately represented among the affected class.132  In a cursory 
analysis, the Court accepted the agency’s safety justification as satisfying the 
business necessity test.133  Then in quick succession, the Supreme Court 
declined to extend the theory to contracting claims filed under the civil rights 
statute known as § 1981, voting rights under the Fifteenth Amendment, 
and a challenge to a road closing.134  The only application of the theory the 
Court permitted was a complicated decision allowing disparate impact 
challenges under the regulations implementing Title VI, the governmental 
funding statute requiring nondiscrimination, even while holding that the 
statute itself only precluded intentional discrimination.135 
By the end of the theory’s first decade, the Court had rejected more 
challenges than it had accepted, and it had largely limited the theory to its 
origins—namely testing claims and perhaps some other objective proce-
dures capable of formal validation.  At this point, there was little reason to 
think the disparate impact theory would mark a radical doctrinal shift.  A theory 
that burst onto the scene in 1971 ended its first decade with a whimper.  As 
                                                                                                                            
 130. See id.  
 131. See id. at 335 (“A woman’s relative ability to maintain order in a male, maximum-
security, unclassified penitentiary of the type Alabama now runs could be directly reduced by her 
womanhood.”). 
 132. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
 133. Id. at 587 n.31.  The Court accepted the Transit Authority’s policies that methadone 
was a narcotic that created many problems associated with other narcotics such as drowsiness and 
insomnia.  Id. at 588 n.32. 
 134. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (holding 
that § 1981 prohibiting discrimination in contracting only reaches intentional conduct); City of 
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (rejecting an intentional discrimination challenge to a road 
closing in Memphis that adversely affected African Americans); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 
(1980) (holding that the Fifteenth Amendment only precludes intentional discrimination). 
 135. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).  The Guardians case 
is notoriously difficult, complicated by the various opinions issued in the case.  In the way the 
claim unfolded, the case was primarily about the government’s power to issue regulations 
proscribing disparate impact.  The Supreme Court has since reversed that part of the Guardians 
decision.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
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described in the next section, the two ensuing decades simply confirmed the 
theory’s limited reach, even within employment discrimination, despite the 
theory’s unmistakable allure among academics and advocates. 
II. ASSESSING THE THEORY IN THE COURTS 
To this point, I have focused on the origins of the disparate impact 
theory in its particular historical context, as well as the development of the 
theory in the Supreme Court.  In this section, I shift focus to the way the 
theory has developed in the lower courts, including an empirical assessment 
of the success litigants have had under the theory.  In addition to its 
extended reach, one of the central attractions to disparate impact claims is the 
perception that they are easier to prove than claims of intentional dis-
crimination, given that intent is often difficult to establish through circum-
stantial evidence.136  In reality, however, the opposite is true: Disparate 
impact claims are more difficult to prove than standard intentional dis-
crimination claims.  This is particularly significant given that employment 
discrimination claims themselves are notoriously difficult to prove.137 
A. The Scope of the Study 
As part of this project, I have reviewed all of the disparate impact cases 
from select years in both district courts and courts of appeals.  As indicated 
in Table A, I reviewed all of the reported appellate cases for 1984–1985, 
1994–1995, and 1999–2001 for a total of six years for which there were 
130 reported cases.  By reported cases, I mean those cases available on 
LEXIS/NEXIS, including unpublished decisions.138  In addition, I have reviewed 
                                                                                                                            
 136. See sources cited supra notes 10, 12. 
 137. This principle has been documented repeatedly.  For an early articulation, see 
Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. 
L.J. 1567 (1989) (establishing that employment discrimination cases have a success rate superior 
only to prisoner cases).  See also Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard 
to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001) (exploring reasons for the difficulty of proving cases); sources 
cited infra notes 151–153. 
 138. After collecting the cases, I excluded from the counts those that may have stated a 
claim of disparate impact theory without any discussion or ruling, or where the theory was simply 
mentioned, or where they were purely procedural claims including class certification and remedial 
orders.  There were a significant number of these cases, and it appears that many plaintiffs allege a 
disparate impact theory without ever attempting to develop the theory.  The search was a basic 
one: date specified and “disparate impact” or “disparate w/1 impact” (there was no difference 
between the two).  This search picked up a significant number of nonemployment cases that were 
also excluded from the analysis but which were reviewed to determine the effect the theory has 
had in other areas, such as housing or environmental claims. 
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all of the cases within the district courts for six years (1983, 1987, 1991, 
1996, 1999, 2002), with a total of 171 reported cases.  Combining both 
samples produces a total of 301 analyzed cases.  In selecting the years to 
study, I sought to avoid substantial overlap, but I also wanted to capture 
trends that might have emerged over time, trends which turned out most 
apparent in the district court cases.  I coded the cases based on the court’s 
determination, whether the appellate court affirmed or reversed a judgment, 
either with respect to summary judgment or a trial, or reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings.  In the district court, decisions on the 
merits were recorded for both trials and motions to dismiss, and when 
plaintiffs survived a motion for summary judgment (or a motion to dismiss) the 
case was categorized as a success for the plaintiff.  I also noted the nature of the 
claim (for example, race, sex, or age) and sought to determine the basis for 
the challenge, whether, for example, it was a challenge to a test, a subjective 
employment practice, or some other practice.139  Each of the cases was 
checked for subsequent history but that history itself did not affect the 
empirical analysis unless the case also appeared in one of the other years 
under review.140 
In addition to this systematic study of cases, I analyzed various seg-
ments of cases that seemed potentially revealing.  I reviewed all of the 
appellate court cases decided between Griggs and Washington v. Davis, as 
well as many of the district court cases decided during that period, and all 
cases that arose after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that con-
tained any substantial doctrinal discussion.  The latter group included fewer 
than a dozen cases; one unmistakable trend is the waning importance of the 
disparate impact theory after the Civil Rights Act of 1991.141  Undoubtedly, 
the addition of damages for intentional discrimination claims provided by 
the 1991 Act, while withholding them from disparate impact claims, has 
substantially altered the incentives for defining claims as intentional dis-
crimination.142  In addition, as discussed more fully below, I analyzed certain 
                                                                                                                            
 139. In several instances, the plaintiff prevailed on one claim but lost on others.  In those 
circumstances, of which there were very few, the case would be categorized as a win and a loss. 
 140. In other words, if a plaintiff succeeded in a district court case in 1991 but that case was 
later reversed in 1993 (a year not included in the study), that reversal would be noted, but the 
1991 victory would be counted as a plaintiff’s victory. 
 141. Ironically, the disparate impact theory was considered the most important and controversial 
provision of the Act.  See Adam Clymer, Senate Democrats Back a Compromise on Civil Rights Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, at A1 (noting that the Administration and Congress “have fought over when 
businesses can impose hiring conditions that appear fair but discriminate in practice”). 
 142. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 made damages available for claims of intentional 
discrimination, whereas prior to that Act only equitable relief was available.  Damages, however, 
are not available for disparate impact claims.  See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) 
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cases and areas that have received particular attention by scholars, includ-
ing age discrimination cases and those involving subjective employment 
practices, pregnancy discrimination cases, and a set of cases involving men 
who wear beards.  My goal was to offer a more detailed, but not fully exhaus-
tive, portrait of how the disparate impact theory has fared in the courts. 
Much of the empirical analysis that follows is based on cases that are 
available on the LEXIS/NEXIS database and therefore provides only a lim-
ited picture of the universe of cases.  To the extent that it is a representa-
tive sample, relying on published cases can offer substantial insight into the 
structure of litigation.143  This issue has been played out extensively in the 
literature.  Recent years also have seen a substantial increase in studies 
evaluating published decisions.144  Published decisions are even more likely 
to present a substantial picture of the litigation landscape for disparate 
impact claims than other kinds of cases because they are typically class 
actions, at least for most successful claims.145  By their nature, class action 
claims have more at stake, not just in monetary terms but also in terms of 
                                                                                                                            
(2000).  Many of the recent large class action claims have proceeded under an intentional discrimination 
theory, even though many of their core allegations sound in traditional disparate impact language. 
 143. It is frequently noted that only about 25 percent of cases are represented in published 
opinions.  See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue, III, Studying the Iceberg From Its Tip: A 
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
1133 (1990).  This figure is now likely higher given that today more technically unpublished cases 
are available on electronic databases. 
 144. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of 
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471 (2005) (evaluating cases on removal 
standards); Ruth Colker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999) (analyzing published Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cases); 
Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548 
(2001) (analyzing published sexual harassment cases); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts 
Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury 
Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511 (2003) 
(analyzing reported California employment law cases); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997) (reviewing published 
environmental cases to determine judicial voting patterns); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About 
Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases 
Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990) (analyzing cases where 
employers assert lack of interest as a defense to sex disparities); John A. Swain & Edwin E. 
Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal Jurisdiction Over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study 
of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U. L. REV. 445 (2004) (reviewing published decisions). 
 145. There are a surprising number of individual claims, almost all of which fail.  In the 
context of this study, it is not particularly relevant if successful claims are overrepresented among 
published cases because that would simply bias the study in favor of the disparate impact theory, 
and mean that the strength of the theory would be overrepresented in the empirical study.  
Similarly, among the settled cases, it is only an issue if those cases differ substantially from the 
published cases, for example, if there is a higher percentage of strong plaintiff cases among the 
settled cases.  Without some basis, there is no particular reason to believe that would be the case, 
and it is more likely that strong plaintiff and defendant cases are among the settled claims. 
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publicity and potential injunctive relief.  The size of the cases, and the 
prospect of costly injunctive relief, suggest that these claims are likely to be 
litigated at some level rather than quickly settled, although the potential 
for adverse publicity might influence some companies to settle quickly.146  
And because so much is at stake, adverse decisions are more likely to be 
appealed than in a typical case. 
A difference may exist between published and unpublished cases in the 
testing claims.  Assuming that cases are settled in the shadow of the law,147 
employers may have settled testing cases more readily because the law was 
better established, somewhat favorable to plaintiffs, and potentially costly 
to litigate.  Yet, as discussed more below, the published cases also demon-
strate significant success for plaintiffs in the testing cases, so there is noth-
ing necessarily lost by excluding unpublished cases.148  At the same time, the 
success rate of nontesting cases is so low that it seems inconceivable that 
there is a substantial segment of such claims that defendants readily settle 
without litigating in a way that would produce an opinion available in an 
electronic database.149  Finally, even if the data set is not fully representative 
of the universe of disparate impact claims, it remains a valuable compara-
tive resource for understanding the power and limits of the theory.  Within 
law, we too often focus on a very limited set of leading cases, such as the 
Griggs decision, which is sometimes the only disparate impact case taught in 
a course on employment law.  This survey represents the most comprehen-
sive overview of the theory. 
                                                                                                                            
 146. This is what arguably occurred in the race discrimination cases involving Texaco and 
Coca-Cola.  Indeed, the case against Coca-Cola was settled without any substantial motions 
having been decided.  In contrast, Home Depot, Denny’s, and now Wal-Mart have all engaged in 
substantial litigation despite the adverse publicity.  For a discussion of these cases, see Michael 
Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation 
and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003). 
 147. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (arguing that cases are settled within the shadows of 
existing law). 
 148. Conceivably, if there are a substantial number of unpublished but successful testing 
cases, the success rates of the empirical study could be skewed if those testing cases far outnumber 
unpublished unsuccessful disparate impact cases.  However, as discussed in the text, because the 
success rate of other kinds of disparate impact claims is so low, the claims ought to offset one 
another so that the published cases reflect the broader class of claims. 
 149. As noted previously, cases might be settled for their nuisance value, particularly given 
that litigating adverse impact claims can be quite expensive.  If this is true, it is difficult to see 
how this could be treated as a benefit, rather than an unintended consequence of the theory, as 
presumably no one but the most zealous plaintiff advocates would countenance the creation of a 
theory solely for the purpose of creating nuisance value. 
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B. The Success of the Disparate Impact Theory 
1. Empirical Assessment 
There were a total of 130 appellate cases analyzed in the manner 
described above, and plaintiffs prevailed in only 19.2 percent of the cases, and 
60 percent of these cases (15 of 25) were remands rather than outright 
victories.150  In contrast, the majority of the defendants’ victories affirmed the 
granting of summary judgment motions (62 of the 105 determinations 
favorable to defendants, or 59 percent), and another 38 determinations (36.1 
percent) preserved defendants’ trial verdicts.  The figures are even more 
dramatic when the years 1984–85 are excluded because those years accounted 
for 56 percent of the plaintiffs’ successful claims (14 of 25).  The success rates 
were substantially lower for 1994–95 and 1999–2001, during which time 
period only two successful trial verdicts were preserved on appeal. 
 
TABLE A 
DISPARATE IMPACT DETERMINATIONS 
COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS 
 
 Plaintiff 
 
Defendant 
 Aff Rev Rem Total SJ Trial Rev Rem Total 
1984–85 5 3 6 14 12 20 3 0 35 
1994–95 1 0 2 3 14 11 0 2 27 
1999–01 1 0 7 8 36 7 0 0 43 
Total 7 3 15 25 62 38 3 2 105 
Source: Lexis/Nexis 
 
Plaintiff’s Success Rate: 
1984–85 28.5% 
1994–95 10.0% 
1999–01 15.6% 
Total 19.2% 
                                                                                                                            
 150. Because of the nature of this study, I will avoid providing citations to select cases, and 
where I provide citations, it will typically be for an entire category of claims, or to illustrate some 
particular proposition.  One of the issues one becomes acutely aware of when conducting a study 
like this is that it is easy to find a single case to support a particular argument, as most lawyers 
readily know.  In this study, however, I want to provide a more comprehensive picture rather than 
focusing on leading or illustrative cases. 
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The figures for the district court decisions are quite similar but have 
some important variations.  There were 171 cases in the six analyzed years, 
and the plaintiffs’ succeeded in 25.1 percent of the cases.  As was true with 
the appellate court cases, a substantial number of what I define as successful 
claims involved surviving summary judgment, and restricting the cases to 
decisions on the merits lowers the success rate to 16.9 percent.  Plaintiffs 
fared substantially better during 1983, a year that accounts for 27.9 percent 
of the successful cases, and 42.3 percent of the successful trial victories.  
Excluding 1983, the plaintiffs obtained only 15 outright victories, for a suc-
cess rate on the merits of 13 percent (15 of 115). 
 
TABLE B 
DISPARATE IMPACT DETERMINATIONS 
DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS 
 
 Plaintiff 
 
Defendant 
 Prevails Forward Total SJ Trial Total 
1983 11 1 12 3 10 13 
1987 7 2 9 13 9 22 
1991 4 6 10 20 5 25 
1996 1 2 3 21 2 23 
1999 1 4 5 18 1 19 
2002 2 2 4 26 0 26 
Total 26 17 43 101 27 128 
Source: Lexis/Nexis 
 
Plaintiff’s Success Rate: 
1983 48.0% 
1987 29.0% 
1991 28.6% 
1996 11.5% 
1999 20.8% 
2002 13.3% 
Total 25.1% 
 
Although the statistics are imperfect, they plainly reflect the difficulty of 
proving disparate impact cases.  Numerous studies have shown that employment 
discrimination cases tend to have a success rate in federal court of 
approximately 35 percent, while civil cases more broadly tend to have success 
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rates that approximate 50 percent.151  There are some variations within 
these studies, and I have not sought to determine whether the success rate of 
disparate impact cases is significantly lower statistically than employment 
discrimination cases more generally,152 but no evidence seems to suggest that 
disparate impact claims are easier to prove than disparate treatment claims.  
Going behind the numbers also reveals the limits of the disparate impact 
theory, including providing insight into why so many of the cases fail. 
The cases can generally be divided into three broad categories: (1) pure 
disparate impact claims; (2) mixed claims of disparate treatment and impact; 
and (3) add-on claims where the disparate impact claim is added on but 
never properly developed.  Claims in this latter group never succeed, although 
there might be some litigation advantages to asserting a disparate impact 
claim, perhaps for its settlement value.153  The second category of claim is 
more interesting.  One important finding of this analysis is the high 
percentage of successful disparate impact cases that also succeed on dispa-
rate treatment theories.  Among the successful appellate court cases, nearly 
one-third also succeeded on a disparate treatment claim, and one-half of 
the district court cases (21 of 43) included successful disparate treatment 
claims.  The numbers were even higher during the early years.  In 1983, 
                                                                                                                            
 151. In a recent study, defendants obtained appellate reversals in nearly 44 percent of their 
employment discrimination appeals.  See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia 
in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ From Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 947, 957.  Plaintiffs also had an extremely low success rate following defendant trial verdicts.  
Id. (noting that plaintiffs succeeded in reversing only 6 percent of defendant trial victories); see 
also Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in 
Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004) (reviewing Administrative Office of Courts 
Case Data); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Employment Discrimination Cases in Federal District 
Courts, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (analyzing case files for district courts). 
 152. Most of the studies involve diverse databases and thus limit the prospect of simple 
comparisons.  I have not sought to determine whether a meta-analysis would be feasible.  The success 
rates also vary by time and by the nature of the claim with some evidence that age discrimination 
plaintiffs fare better than other employment discrimination plaintiffs, while disability plaintiffs 
have frequently fared worse.  See Colker, supra note 144, at 107–10 (demonstrating success rates as 
low as 5 percent for ADA plaintiffs in years following passage of the Act); George Rutherglen, 
From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 512 
(1995) (documenting 47 percent defendant success rate in non−Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) cases but only 26.3 percent in ADEA cases, taking into account settlements). 
 153. A claim that never succeeds should have no settlement value or certainly nothing 
above a nuisance value.  However, there does seem to be widespread misperception regarding the 
viability of disparate impact claims and this misperception may add some value to the claims.  
One might also suggest that these cases should be excluded from the empirical analysis, which 
would raise the overall success rates significantly.  But it would also dampen the comparative 
effect because many disparate treatment claims have little merit, and those claims are part of the 
calculations in other studies.  The analysis that follows focuses on substantive cases, and within 
those cases the success rate is still very low. 
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three-fourths (8 of 12) of successful disparate impact claims in the district 
courts also succeeded under a theory of disparate treatment.  The high per-
centage of cases in 1983 supports the notion that the early cases were more 
closely associated with theories of intentional discrimination, which 
undoubtedly accounts for much of the early success.154 
In the remaining category, pure claims, plaintiffs have achieved some 
success, although that success has clearly decreased over time, particularly 
after the mid-1980s.  Many challenges to employment tests were successful 
in the 1970s, and like Griggs, these challenges typically involved defendants 
who had made little, or no, effort to validate the examinations at issue.155  
With time, these challenges have become increasingly difficult for plaintiffs 
as tests have become more sophisticated and professionally developed for 
their particular use, and as courts have become less concerned about the 
disparate impact of the tests.  Courts appear far more willing to accept vali-
dation efforts today than they were a decade or two ago, and they are also 
far less likely to find that a test has adverse impact than they once were.156  
The latter finding is partly attributable to the change in the nature of the 
cases.  Adverse impact was relatively easy to identify when the tests were 
administered with a large group of diverse applicants, such as with urban 
police departments, but it is far more difficult to establish with small 
                                                                                                                            
 154. See, e.g., Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 1509 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (holding 
that required truck driver experience had disparate impact on women in a company that had long 
excluded women), aff’d, 789 F.2d 859 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding the requirement was a pretext for 
discrimination); Veazie v. Greyhound Lines Inc., No. 72-2729, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11889 
(E.D. La. Nov. 8, 1983) (holding that a seniority system had its genesis in intentional 
discrimination); Catlett v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 589 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Mo. 1983) 
(holding that word of mouth recruiting caused disparate impact on women and finding disparate 
treatment based in part on historical practices), aff’d, 828 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1987) (focusing on 
the disparate treatment claim). 
 155. See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1372–73 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(enjoining the use of written employment tests until the employer made an effort to validate the 
tests with the EEOC); Walston v. County Sch. Bd., 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974) (finding the cut-
off score on a teacher test arbitrary and unvalidated); W. Addition Cmty. Org. v. Alioto, 360 F. 
Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (upholding the plaintiffs’ successful challenge to a San Francisco 
Firefighters examination for which the defendants offered no validation study); Harper v. Mayor 
of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973) (holding that a firefighter examination was 
discriminatory when only “questionable” validation effort was offered), modified and aff’d sub nom. 
Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973). 
 156. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Chicago, 351 F.3d 306 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding a 
promotion test by rejecting the plaintiffs’ alternative practice); Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 
308 F.3d 286 (3rd Cir. 2002) (upholding a physical agility examination); Firefighters’ Inst. for 
Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 220 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding a fire department 
promotional exam despite disparate impact); Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 187 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 
1999) (granting summary judgment on validity grounds); see additional cases cited infra note 225. 
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numbers of applicants as increasingly occurs today.157  In the early 1970s, 
many jurisdictions also decided not to defend the adverse impact of their 
tests, either because their validation efforts had been inadequate or for 
political reasons.  As I will discuss below, many governmental entities 
appeared to have welcomed, at least to an extent, disparate impact 
challenges as a means to diversify their workforces.158 
Looking solely at the cases with successful disparate impact claims provides 
additional support for the limitations of the theory.  As noted previously, 
many successful disparate impact claims also succeeded under a disparate 
treatment approach, thus rendering the disparate impact theory largely 
superfluous.  Another substantial set of cases involved remands for further 
determinations without any indication of what occurred on remand, 
although the most likely prospect is that the cases settled and could there-
fore be treated as successful cases for the plaintiffs.  There were also a small 
set of successful district court cases reversed on appeal.  At the same time, 
among the successful cases, there was a surprising dearth of testing cases in 
the later years, most likely for two reasons.  A significant portion of testing 
cases may have been resolved along the way because the law was most set-
tled on issues relating to testing and the standards for validation.  For 
employers that had not done any validation, their likelihood of success in 
most jurisdictions was quite poor.  As employers began to validate their exami-
nations, these cases likely migrated from successful plaintiff cases to successful 
defendant cases, substantially restricting the prospect of prevailing.159 
Outside of the testing cases, the successful cases are not easy to catego-
rize and instead are best described as a miscellaneous set of cases.  In the 
sample, there were successful challenges to various ranking systems, referral 
policies, and severance pay;160 there were also several cases that mirrored 
                                                                                                                            
 157. See, e.g., Boyd v. Borg-Warner Protective Servs., Inc., No. 98-14072-CIV-Roettger, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13974 (S.D. Fla. July 21, 1999) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish 
the disparate impact of a fitness test); Mems v. City of St. Paul, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (D. Minn. 
1999), aff’d, 224 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that statistical evidence based on a ten-person 
sample was insufficient to prove disparate impact). 
 158. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 159. Another reason the cases may have receded is that many of the initial cases were filed 
by the Department of Justice, which has since mostly abandoned testing cases for political reasons.  
Civil rights groups also brought many challenges in the early years, and those groups have 
significantly restricted their litigation over the last decade. 
 160. See EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 814 (1995) (invalidating a sponsorship requirement for a union with no minority 
members); Crawford v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1984) (invalidating a defendant-
employer’s index review system); Caviale v. Wisconsin, 744 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1984) (invalidating 
participation in a career program as a prerequisite to promotion); Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 
726 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1984) (invalidating a requirement of prior supervisory experience). 
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some of the early claims involving patronage and degree requirements.161  
These cases, however, are isolated and no obvious pattern emerged.  Novel 
claims were also few and far between, with the only distinctive claim 
involving a challenge brought by female police officers to a police depart-
ment’s choice of gun for its officers.162  One area where the theory may have 
made a difference is with residency requirements; the established principle 
today is that residency requirements are permissible for employees so long as 
there is a reasonable move-in period, but they are impermissible for applicants, 
at least in a city where the population is homogeneous.163  A surprising area 
within the sample involved several cases challenging English-only policies 
where the district court allowed the claims to survive summary judgment 
even though appellate courts have proved uniformly hostile to such claims.164 
                                                                                                                            
 161. See Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers’ Int’l Union, 177 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(upholding a race discrimination claim against a union for failure to refer jobs); Nash v. Consol. 
City of Jacksonville, 763 F.2d 1393 (11th Cir. 1985) (reversing the district court in a testing claim 
for applying the wrong legal standard), rev’d, 905 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1990); Cooper v. Rosenberg, 
694 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (involving patronage); Baranek v. Kelly, No. 85-0376-C, 1987 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8338, at 17–20 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 1987) (invalidating a bachelor’s degree 
requirement that employer conceded had no business necessity). 
 162. See Pumphrey v. City of Coeur D’Alene, No. 92-36748, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3892 
(9th Cir. Feb. 24, 1994).  Two other claims might also be considered novel.  In Murphy v. 
Derwinski, 776 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Colo. 1991), the Veteran’s Administration (VA) sought a Catholic 
chaplain, a position for which a woman applied.  The district court found the VA’s requirement 
that the chaplain have the church’s endorsement as discriminatory under a disparate impact 
approach, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.  See Murphy v. Derwinski, 990 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 
1993).  This seems an unusual case for the disparate impact theory, and the religious dimensions 
to the case also make it difficult to classify as a pure Title VII case.  In another case, the plaintiff 
survived a motion to dismiss in her challenge to the employer’s policy of refusing to grant a leave 
of absence for periods of incarceration.  See Butler v. Elwyn Inst., 765 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
 163. Both the Department of Justice and the NAACP filed a series of challenges to 
municipal residency requirements, and when the cases were litigated, the plaintiffs typically 
prevailed.  See Newark Branch, NAACP v. Township of Harrison, 940 F.2d 792 (3rd Cir. 1991) 
(invalidating a residency requirement); United States v. City of Warren, 759 F. Supp. 355 (E.D. 
Mich. 1991) (same).  A recent case, however, has demonstrated that removing residency 
requirements does not necessarily increase the number of minority employees.  The NAACP sued 
the city of Bayonne, arguing that its residency requirement was discriminatory, and the parties 
settled.  During the course of the settlement, the City found that the number of minority 
employees actually decreased, most likely as a result of a civil service examination administered 
statewide.  The Third Circuit subsequently upheld the city’s determination to reimpose its 
residency requirement.  See Newark Branch, NAACP v. City of Bayonne, 134 F.3d 113 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
 164. See EEOC v. Synchro-Start Products, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Ill. 1999) 
(holding that an English-only policy survived the defendant’s summary judgment motion); EEOC 
v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (finding a prima facie case 
of disparate impact and treatment for an English-only policy).  In contrast, the courts of appeals 
have rejected the challenges that have come before them.  See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 
1480 (9th Cir. 1993); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987); Garcia v. Gloor, 
618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).  An exception arose in the 
Ninth Circuit, which upheld a challenge to an English-only policy instituted by the Los Angeles 
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2. Subjective Employment Practices and Age Cases 
For many years, advocates sought to extend the disparate impact the-
ory to cases involving subjective employment practices and age dis-
crimination, under the express idea that the theory would uncover more 
discrimination than could be rooted out by the more common intentional 
discrimination framework.  In both instances, the efforts ultimately succeeded 
in that the Supreme Court extended the theory to such cases.  However, 
these claims have been almost uniformly unsuccessful; indeed, successful 
claims are almost always pursued as claims of intentional discrimination.  As a 
result, these two areas illustrate both the allure and the limits of the theory. 
Subjective employment practices have long been the focus of dis-
crimination claims, in large part because the discretion inherent in 
subjective practices can be a slippery vehicle for discrimination.  These 
claims can be difficult to establish as intentional discrimination because 
they commonly rely on circumstantial evidence.  In contrast, to the extent 
that subjective practices favor a preferred group, it might be possible to 
establish a significant disparate impact that would then require employers 
to justify those practices.  In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust,165 the 
Supreme Court ultimately recognized the utility of applying the disparate 
impact theory to subjective employment practices, but at the same time, the plu-
rality opinion authored by Justice O’Connor expressed concern that 
employers might have difficulty justifying their practices under the business 
necessity test.166  The case has been a mixed blessing for plaintiffs; the real-
ity is that subjective employment practices are almost always more success-
ful as intentional discrimination claims. 
The reason has to do with the nature of subjective employment prac-
tices.  There is nothing accidental about those practices; rather, employers 
use such practices and make such decisions intentionally, and I would add, 
consciously.  Although it is true that intent can be difficult to prove, it is 
                                                                                                                            
Municipal Court.  See Gutierrez v. Mun. Court, 861 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988).  That case, 
however, was subsequently vacated as moot by the Supreme Court.  See Mun. Court v. Gutierrez, 
490 U.S. 1016 (1989).  Depending on the rationale for the policy, English-only cases can be litigated 
as intentional discrimination cases, and as the appellate court cases demonstrate, when the 
employer has a reasonable justification, the policy is typically upheld. 
 165. 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion).   
 166. Id.  While permitting disparate impact challenges to subjective employment practices, 
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion likewise noted that the burden of proof remains with the 
plaintiff at all times, id. at 997, and further required the plaintiff to identify the specific 
employment practice causing the disparity.  Id. at 996–97.  In ratcheting up the proof standards, 
Justice O’Connor specifically noted the prospect that employers might “adopt surreptitious quota 
systems in order to ensure that no plaintiff can establish a statistical prima facie case.”  Id. at 992. 
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certainly not impossible, and often is easier to prove than through a theory 
of disparate impact.  As Justice O’Connor hinted, there is no ready means 
to validate subjective employment practices under the disparate impact 
theory, leaving courts to apply their own normative judgments regarding 
whether the practices are discriminatory.167  As discussed in more detail in 
the next section, the judicial inquiry turns on how the subjectivity is exer-
cised, an inquiry that lends itself to a disparate treatment analysis.  For 
example, if managers apply subjective criteria in a way that favors men over 
women, then there is likely something about the way the criteria are used 
that results in women being treated differently, and there is no reason to 
avail oneself of the disparate impact theory.168  Under a disparate impact 
approach, the employer would have to justify its use of subjective practices, 
but short of requiring employers to prove that subjective practices are the 
best employment practice, a standard the Supreme Court long ago 
rejected,169 there is no basis for evaluating subjective practices other than in 
how they are applied.  An employer’s differential treatment often will be 
the product of stereotyping rather than a demonstrable overt practice, but 
contrary to the view of some commentators,170 stereotyping fits better 
                                                                                                                            
 167. Id. at 991 (discussing the difficulty of validating subjective employment criteria such as 
“common sense, good judgment, originality, ambition, loyalty, and tact”).  In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Blackmun referenced the possibility of validating subjective employment 
practices, based on an amicus submission by the American Psychological Association.  See id. at 
1007 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  While this may be theoretically possible, it is not at all 
common and may be the product of a self-interested industry rather than something one might 
reasonably expect in a workplace.  More commonly, subjective practices are validated by 
rendering them more objective.  This process, however, is intended to severely limit discretion, 
which is quite different from validating a subjective process where discretion is at the core. 
 168. In a recent challenge to subjective promotion practices, the Eighth Circuit explained:  
It is difficult to understand this claim as one of disparate impact.  Plaintiffs’ claim as to the 
subjective decisionmaking process is not that this facially race-neutral process has an adverse 
impact on blacks and the process cannot be justified by business necessity.  Rather, 
Plaintiffs claim the subjective decisionmaking resulted in blacks remaining in center-
manager positions longer than whites before they were promoted to the division-manager 
level.  We read Plaintiffs’ argument as alleging disparate treatment through the 
subjective decisionmaking process; that is, that the subjective selection process provided 
the opportunity for UPS to choose not to promote some employees because they were 
black—to discriminate on account of race. 
Morgan v. UPS, Inc., 380 F.3d 459, 465 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1933 (2005).  
The appellate court applied the disparate treatment model, rejected the plaintiffs’ statistical 
analysis, and upheld the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants.  Id. at 468–72. 
 169. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
 170. In her plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor also noted the importance of the 
disparate impact theory for rooting out “subconscious stereotypes and prejudices . . . .”  
Watson, 487 U.S. at 990.  As discussed below, many academics have suggested applying disparate 
impact theory, or a form of it, to capture stereotyping.  See, e.g., Jody D. Armour, Race 
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within an intentional discrimination framework than within the business 
necessity model applicable to impact claims.  After all, there is no permissi-
ble business rationale for relying on negative stereotypes, and the most dif-
ficult part of the proof is establishing that stereotyping factored into the 
decisionmaking process.  The disparate impact model has nothing to do 
with that proof, and if stereotyping can be proved, a finding of intentional 
discrimination should follow.171 
The recent spate of class action cases confirms the propriety of challenging 
subjective practices as intentional discrimination.  In the last decade, class 
action attorneys have filed suits against many large employers, including 
Wal-Mart and Home Depot, for using subjective employment practices that 
disadvantage women.172  Although the cases frequently include allegations 
to support a disparate impact claim, the cases have all proceeded primarily 
as claims of intentional discrimination under the statistical pattern or 
practice theory, and in each instance, the plaintiffs have sought to prove 
intent through detailed statistical analyses.173  To date, the cases have all 
settled, leaving little precedential trail.  Yet, there is no question that the 
intentional discrimination framework can serve to challenge subjective 
employment practices, and there is very little to gain, and much to lose, by 
resorting to the disparate impact framework.174 
The same proves true for age discrimination cases, though for some-
what different reasons.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent acceptance of 
the disparate impact theory under the age discrimination statute, a number 
of appellate courts had held that the theory was unavailable for age 
                                                                                                                            
Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 781, 811–12 (1994) (calling for a new model directed at unconscious bias). 
 171. In the district court, Watson lost her disparate treatment claim.  See Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 172. Sex discrimination lawsuits also have been filed against Costco and many grocers and 
securities firms.  These claims are discussed in Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies 
Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1 (2005). 
 173. Id. at 18. 
 174. Within the sample, I was able to identify two cases involving subjective practices that 
prevailed on an impact theory but not on an intentional discrimination cause of action.  In 
Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 1999), the court allowed a disparate 
impact challenge to the company’s interview process to go forward while ruling against the 
plaintiff’s treatment claim.  The business necessity issue, however, was not addressed.  Id. at 1315 
n.10.  And Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561 (4th Cir. 1985), was principally a 
disparate impact case where the plaintiffs succeeded in their challenge to assignment and 
promotion policies, although it could also be read as a disparate treatment claim because the court 
moved between the two standards. 
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claims.175  Although these courts typically applied some statutory analysis, 
their real concern was normative: Age claims might prove too disruptive to 
standard business practices, many of which frequently have a disparate 
effect on older workers.  In these courts, age claims involving disparate 
impact theories were often seen as the discrimination equivalent of 
securities cases, where plaintiffs’ attorneys are sometimes accused of filing 
suit any time there is a significant stock price drop.  Age discrimination 
claims were perceived as routinely following mass layoffs or reductions in 
force, which frequently would adversely impact older workers who were 
often more expensive than their younger counterparts even when their 
experience and productivity were taken into account.  As Judge Posner 
once noted, allowing disparate impact claims in these situations is highly 
problematic and might “as a practical matter forbid all firms to reduce wages 
or fringe benefits in periods of adversity.”176  Judge Posner’s statement cap-
tures the prevailing sentiment that the disparate impact theory simply 
proved too much, unless the plaintiffs could show that older employees had 
been targeted because of their age rather than because of their expense.177  
Of course, if the plaintiffs could make that showing, they would succeed on 
an intentional discrimination claim. 
                                                                                                                            
 175. The cases are catalogued and discussed in Kenneth R. Davis, Age Discrimination and 
Disparate Impact: A New Look at an Age-Old Problem, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 361 (2004). 
 176. Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1992).  Judge 
Posner’s influential opinion, in a case that challenged TWA’s decision to cap vacation time as 
part of a bankruptcy proceeding, is worth quoting at length:  
There is something wrong with an interpretation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act that forbids a bankrupt corporation to adopt a companywide policy of 
limiting paid vacations to 4 weeks a year and that would as a practical matter forbid all 
firms to reduce wages or fringe benefits in periods of adversity. 
Id.  Earlier in the opinion Judge Posner had noted:  
A company that for legitimate business reasons decides to cut wages across the board, or to cut 
out dental insurance, or to curtail the use of company cars is not required to conduct a study 
to determine the impact of the measure on employees grouped by age and if it is 
nonrandom to prove that the same amount of money could not have been saved in some 
different fashion. 
Id. at 1163. 
 177. See, e.g., Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 677 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The ADEA was not 
intended to protect older workers from the often harsh economic realities of common business 
decisions and the hardships associated with corporate reorganizations, downsizing, plant closings 
and relocations.”); Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1466–67 (6th Cir. 1990) (suggesting 
that in a reduction in force case plaintiffs must show they were singled out because of age).  As an 
example of the road to which the disparate impact theory can lead, in Stutts v. Sears, Roebuck and 
Co., 855 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ala. 1994), the plaintiffs challenged a companywide compensation 
plan and proposed as an alternative an entirely different wage structure, much like a management 
consultant might do.  The court rejected this effort.  Id. at 1581. 
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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Smith v. City of Jackson178 con-
firms the limited thrust of the disparate impact theory for age dis-
crimination claims.  In Smith, the Court upheld the applicability of the 
disparate impact theory to age discrimination claims largely borrowing from 
its prior cases, including Watson.179  Yet, the Court also upheld the 
employer’s practice of providing larger raises to younger employees to help 
retain them as a reasonable practice that satisfied the business necessity 
prong of the age discrimination inquiry.180  This step was both illustrative 
and surprising for at least two reasons: It was issued by the liberal wing of 
the Court in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, and the question of 
the reasonableness of the policy had not been briefed by any of the parties 
or addressed by the lower courts.181  Rather, the Court summarily approved 
of the practice, removing any doubts that the disparate impact theory would 
prove anything but ephemeral under the age discrimination statute.  Again, 
the empirical sample supports this idea because there were no successful age 
discrimination claims on the merits, and challenges to reductions in force 
have regularly been rejected.182 
                                                                                                                            
 178. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).  
 179. See id. 
 180. Id. at 1546.  The age discrimination statute is structured differently from Title VII in 
that it allows employers to make decisions based on “reasonable factors other than age.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(f)(1) (2000).  The Supreme Court interpreted this provision as part of the employer’s 
defense to a disparate impact inquiry and afforded what appears to be a lower threshold for the 
employer to meet.  In the context of the age discrimination statute, an important unresolved 
question which goes to the core of class claims is whether it is permissible for employers to adopt 
cost saving measures that will have a greater effect on older workers, an inquiry that can be 
pursued under either an intent or impact framework.  Compare Allen, 33 F.3d at 677 (“[P]laintiffs 
must allege that Diebold discriminated against them because they were old, not because they were 
expensive.”) with Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State Coll., 702 F.2d 686, 691–92 (8th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that a cost savings justification was insufficient).  See also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 
604 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff must show more than factors correlated with age to establish 
intentional discrimination). 
 181. The only surprise was that the Court upheld the theory with Justice Scalia deferring to 
the EEOC’s regulations.  See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1547 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment).  Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas concurred in the 
judgment but under the rationale that the disparate impact theory was not available under the 
ADEA.  Id. at 1549 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 182. For cases dismissing challenges to reductions in force, see Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 
358 (2d Cir. 1999); Allen v. Entergy Corp., 181 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 1999); Graffam v. Scott Paper 
Co., No. 95-1046, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 17120 (1st Cir. July 14, 1995); Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. 
Co., 46 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 1995); Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., No. 91-5948, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1340 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 1996).  There were, however, several cases in which the plaintiffs survived 
summary judgment.  See Arnett v. Cal. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 179 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(permitting a challenge to pension benefits proceeds on both disparate treatment and impact 
theories), vacated, 528 U.S. 1111 (2000); Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(reversing the district court for applying the wrong legal standard); Monroe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
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The pursuit of the disparate impact theory for subjective practices and 
age discrimination cases also reveals what is perhaps the most common mis-
take underlying the disparate impact theory.  The expectation that these 
claims would be easier to establish than intentional discrimination claims 
rests entirely on the first part of the theory regarding the prima facie case of 
discrimination, but ignores the business necessity prong, which has always 
proved the greater hurdle. 
3. Pregnant Women and Bearded Men 
Scholars have highlighted two particular issues and associated cases to 
demonstrate the power of the disparate impact theory: cases involving 
claims brought by pregnant women and challenges to policies prohibiting 
employees from wearing beards.  While these two particular issues are unre-
lated, I want to explore them together to illustrate how limited the theory is 
even when it proves successful, as well as the thin reeds on which the myth 
of the disparate impact theory persists. 
Many scholars have advocated the use of the disparate impact theory 
to address workplace structures that disadvantage women, and they rely on 
a series of cases, mostly arising in the district courts, challenging various 
leave policies as disparately impacting women.183  A leading case is EEOC v. 
Warshawsky & Co., where the district court granted summary judgment for a 
plaintiff who challenged an employer’s policy of prohibiting new employees from 
taking sick leave during the first year of employment, a policy the court found 
significantly disadvantaged pregnant women without an adequate employer 
                                                                                                                            
736 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that the plaintiffs survived summary judgment in a challenge 
to a sixty-year requirement for pilots on both disparate treatment and disparate impact); Camacho v. 
Sears Roebuck, 939 F. Supp. 113 (D.P.R. 1996) (allowing a salary structure challenge to go forward).  
I have opted not to provide numerical totals for age discrimination claims because a significant 
number of the cases were dismissed in light of circuit court determinations that the disparate impact 
theory was unavailable for age discrimination cases.  Such determinations have now been reversed, 
but as evident in the Smith case, that does not mean the cases would have proved successful. 
 183. See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. 
REV. 1, 42 (1995) (“Disparate impact analysis can be used to resolve many of the accommodation 
problems faced by pregnant women.”); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential 
of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 84 (2005) (identifying the 
disparate impact theory as a “tool for transforming the workplace”); Joan C. Williams & Nancy 
Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the 
Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 134–36 (2003) (“If, for example, an employer does not permit 
employees with medical needs to take leave, request light duty, take bathroom breaks, or work a flexible 
schedule, a pregnant woman may be able to challenge that policy on the ground that it has a 
disparate impact on women.”).  Admittedly, most of those who tout the disparate impact theory in 
the context of pregnancy-related claims acknowledge what Christine Jolls defines as “unrest, and 
even some outright conflict, in the case law.”  Jolls, supra note 14, at 663. 
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justification.184  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also invalidated 
a union policy that permitted a maximum of ten days of leave because of its 
adverse effect on pregnant women.185  These cases, however, turn out to be 
rather isolated examples of success, and they are countered by a far larger 
array of unsuccessful cases.  The Seventh Circuit, out of which the 
Warshawsky case arose, has in fact upheld restrictive leave policies 
instituted by other school districts, and specifically disclaimed any need to 
treat pregnancy differently from other disabilities.186  Courts have also 
routinely denied challenges to part-time work, light duty requests, and 
disability policies when the requests were made to accommodate 
pregnancy,187 and two appellate courts have questioned the application of 
the disparate impact theory to pregnancy claims at all.188 
                                                                                                                            
 184. See EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991).  This case also can 
be seen as a form of intentional discrimination.  The employer offered no meaningful justification 
for its policy, and the justifications it did offer easily could be satisfied from a more reasonable 
probationary policy of sixty or ninety days.  See id. at 655. 
 185. Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l Union, 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  Another case 
frequently cited as an example of a successful disparate impact challenge is Roberts v. U.S. 
Postmaster General, 947 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tex. 1996), where a woman challenged the policy of 
prohibiting sick leave to care for an ill family member.  Yet, the court in Roberts simply denied a motion 
to dismiss, id. at 289, hardly a sign of success.  As far as I can determine, neither Abraham nor 
Roberts ever has been followed to invalidate a policy as inadequate for covering pregnancy, 
perhaps because employers are not required to provide any leave. 
 186. In Maganuco v. Leyden Community High School District, 212, 939 F.2d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 
1991), the court explained: “The plain meaning of the [Pregnancy Discrimination Act], its 
legislative history, and the Supreme Court’s subsequent discussions of the origins and purposes of 
the Act all suggest that its scope is limited to policies which impact or treat medical conditions 
relating to pregnancy and childbirth less favorably than other disabilities.”  In Maganuco, the 
court upheld a policy that prohibited taking leave immediately following a period of disability or 
sick leave.  See also EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Ass’n, 27 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding leave 
policy that treated pregnant teachers in the same way as those who were not pregnant); United 
States v. Bd. of Educ., 983 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding the maternal leave policy on the 
disparate impact theory while invalidating a sick leave policy as intentional discrimination). 
 187. See, e.g., Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 00-60542, 2002 US App. LEXIS 2573 
(5th Cir. Feb. 19, 2002) (granting summary judgment for defendant in a pregnancy challenge to a 
sick leave policy); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that a 
pregnancy challenge to the practice of only allowing light duty to officers injured on the job failed 
for lack of disparate impact); Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(upholding Delta’s policy of shifting pregnant women to ground duty as a business necessity); 
Dimino v. New York City Transit Auth., 64 F. Supp. 2d 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding disparate 
impact theory inappropriate to challenge disability policy as applied to pregnancy); Ilhardt v. Sara 
Lee Corp., No. 94-C-5034, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13708 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1996), aff’d, 113 F.3d 
1151 (7th Cir. 1997) (denying a disparate impact challenge of a pregnancy limitation on part time 
work); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. H-95-3508, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20412 (S.D. Tex. 
Nov. 1, 1996), aff’d, 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a challenge to a policy on light duty). 
 188. See Rhett v. Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The PDA 
[Pregnancy Discrimination Act] does not require an employer to grant maternity leave or to 
reinstate an employee after a maternity leave.  The PDA merely requires that an employer treat a 
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Consistent with the argument I am developing in this Article, it is 
relatively easy to understand why the pregnancy cases typically fail under 
the disparate impact approach.  If the disparate impact theory were applied 
with rigor to policies that adversely affect pregnant women or women with 
childrearing responsibilities, it could conceivably invalidate many central, 
and common, employment policies, including routine work hours, most 
leave policies, and mandatory overtime.189  Although these policies almost 
certainly have a disparate impact, they are also subject to an employer’s 
business rationale, and few courts appear willing to undo standard business 
practices without a far stronger statutory mandate.  This was the central mean-
ing of Washington v. Davis, which expressed a concern about the possibility 
of the disparate impact theory undoing too much of the status quo.190  
Neither the Pregnancy Discrimination Act191 nor the Family Medical Leave 
Act192 goes so far as to require disturbing core business practices as a means 
of eradicating the disadvantage women suffer as a result of their child-
bearing and childrearing responsibilities. 
                                                                                                                            
pregnant woman in the same fashion as any other temporarily disabled employee.”).  Courts 
generally agree that the disparate impact theory applies, but how the theory applies is a more 
difficult question.  The PDA was added to Title VII to overturn the Supreme Court’s 
determination in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), and it generally defines sex 
discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination.  But the second part of the Act mandates 
that pregnancy be afforded the same treatment as other comparable conditions in relation to one’s 
ability to work.  This same treatment aspect of the PDA would seem to preclude disparate impact 
challenges altogether, but that is not how the provision has been defined.  See also Jolls, supra note 14, 
at 660 (suggesting that the PDA can be construed to require leave).  But see Troupe v. May Dep’t 
Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994).  The court held:  
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not, despite the urgings of feminist 
scholars, . . . require employers to offer maternity leave or take other steps to make it 
easier for pregnant women to work—to make it as easy, say, as it is for their spouses to 
continue working during pregnancy.  Employers can treat pregnant women as badly as they 
treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 189. One scholar has advocated using the disparate impact theory to challenge these 
policies, and suggested consultants could testify about how the workplace could be restructured to 
accommodate work and family demands.  See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY 
FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 104–05 (2000). 
 190. 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).  The Court noted:  
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent 
compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another 
would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole 
range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more 
burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white. 
Id.  
 191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). 
 192. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000). 
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The other example frequently cited as a symbol of the reach of the dis-
parate impact theory likewise turns up to be more aberrational than routine.  
In Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc.,193 the court of appeals invalidated the 
local Domino’s Pizza’s policy of requiring its drivers to be clean shaven 
because the policy had an adverse effect on African Americans, many of 
whom are afflicted with a skin condition that makes shaving difficult or 
impossible.194  The employer sought to justify its policy based on customer 
preference, presenting a survey suggesting that up to 20 percent of its cus-
tomers objected to men with beards.195  Customer preference, as is well 
known, is the very kind of justification that courts are most reluctant to 
accept because it harkens to the pre–Civil Rights era when segregation was 
frequently justified in terms of customer demands.196  Yet as in the pregnancy 
cases, unsuccessful cases outnumber the successful ones and there is no basis 
to conclude that the disparate impact theory has invalidated all no-beard 
policies.197  After the passage of the American With Disabilities Act, which 
was not in effect at the time of the Bradley decision, these cases may now be 
best treated as involving disabilities rather than race discrimination.198 
                                                                                                                            
 193. 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 194. Id.  An earlier decision cited the propriety of applying disparate impact theory.  See 
Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 939 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 195. Bradley, 7 F.3d at 798 (noting that the company “cited a public opinion survey 
indicating that up to twenty percent of customers would ‘have a negative reaction’ to a delivery 
person wearing a beard”). 
 196. In Bradley, the court concluded, “Customer preference, which is at best weakly shown 
by Domino’s survey, is clearly not a colorable business justification defense in this case.”  Id. at 
799.  I cannot help noting that the Domino’s policy has overtones of discrimination, even if that 
was not the intent.  The way the case unfolded, it conveys an image of customers in fear of black 
men with beards, even though the survey focused on men with beards without the racial 
connection.  I suspect, however, that the racial overtones, and the company’s inability to come up 
with a more substantial justification, influenced the court’s determination.  However, courts have 
readily accepted a more substantial justification, such as safety in the case of firefighters.  See 
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993) (upholding a fire department’s no-
beard policy). 
 197. See EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that the 
plaintiff failed to establish that the policy had a disparate impact); EEOC v. Sambo’s of Ga., Inc., 
530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (determining clean shavenness to be a bona fide occupational 
qualification for a restaurant manager in a religious challenge to a no-beard policy); Woods v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Va. 1976) (accepting an employer’s business 
justification tied to customer preference).  Several courts have invalidated policies in situations 
similar to the Bradley case.  See Richardson v. Quik Trip Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Iowa 
1984) (invalidating a no-beard policy); EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54 (D. Colo. 1981) 
(invalidating a no-beard policy for drivers). 
 198. Although there might be a question whether the skin condition rises to the level of a 
disability, the remedy in the cases is a typical disability remedy, namely accommodating 
individuals who are unable to shave.  See Jolls, supra note 14, at 653–56 (equating the case with 
disability accommodation).  Pursuant to the disabilities statute mandate, many employers are now 
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I do not mean to suggest that the cases just discussed were rightly 
decided as a matter of policy or law.  On the contrary, the disparate impact 
theory could have provided protection for older employees during reduc-
tions in the workforce; it could have provided protection to women seeking 
to balance the demands of work and family; it could have aided those with 
beards; and it could have reached discrimination embedded in subjective 
employment practices.  In some cases, the theory did accomplish these 
objectives, but on a broader scale the theory satisfied none of those goals for 
predictable reasons.  The disparate impact theory was a judicial creation 
built on a slippery foundation that, in its business necessity prong, required 
a normative judgment that challenged practices were discriminatory.  In 
other words, a normative judgment that employers should be required to 
retain older workers even if that will lead to significant loss of efficiency 
and higher costs; that employers ought to make accommodations for women 
in order to ease their burdens despite whatever costs might ensue; and that 
subjective practices are a foundation for discrimination.  Just as was true in 
Washington v. Davis, without a theory to explain why these practices ought 
to be impermissible or why the outcomes should be defined as the product 
of discrimination rather than simply why the practices might have satisfied 
the doctrine, courts have been quick to approve common business practices 
despite their disparate impact.  In all, outside of the testing cases, there has 
been no area where the disparate impact theory has proved transformative 
or even particularly successful.  As discussed in the next section, the hope 
academics place in the disparate impact theory is based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of the theory, one that largely explains its 
limited success. 
III. ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY 
By now, it should be clear that the disparate impact theory has pro-
duced limited results in the courts and has rarely been successfully extended 
beyond the testing context.  Yet, as noted in the introduction, this does not 
necessarily establish that the theory was a mistake; rather, it only shows 
that the theory has been less transformative than many scholars and advo-
cates assume.  Equally important, it also substantiates my earlier claim that 
had the Supreme Court ruled differently in Washington v. Davis, the results 
                                                                                                                            
voluntarily accommodating those who suffer from pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB), and one court 
has also required an accommodation for religious reasons to avoid a free exercise violation.  See 
Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 817 (1999). 
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would have been nearly identical, at least in the courts.  A number of 
scholars recently have suggested that social change can occur even in the face 
of significant legal defeats, as the cases can prod employers to make changes 
and increase awareness among the public and employers, while providing a 
tool for personnel departments to alter employment structures they find 
problematic.  For example, Michael McCann has shown that the 
comparable worth movement produced significant change in certain locales 
despite near unanimous defeat in the courts, as the legal cases were used to 
help mobilize effective political action.199  It is quite possible that the disparate 
impact theory had a similar indirect effect on workplace equality; if so, that 
effect ought to be considered when calculating the gains produced by the 
theory, in this instance, outside of the courts.  In addition, there is little 
question that the disparate impact theory proved successful in challenges to 
written tests at least through the early 1980s, and those successes are also an 
important legacy of the theory. 
Measured against these gains, we have the limitations of the theory, 
including the possibility, explored below, that the disparate impact theory 
effectively precluded the development of a more robust theory of intentional 
discrimination—a theory that might have been more effective in addressing 
structural discrimination.  Not only might a broader definition of intent 
have emerged over time, but it is possible that the gains of the disparate 
impact theory, particularly in its most successful early years, could have 
been achieved through claims of intentional discrimination.  As discussed 
earlier, many impact claims also proceed as intent cases, and even no-beard 
policies could be challenged under a theory of intentional discrimination.  
Although an employer with a no-beard policy may not have an intent to exclude 
African Americans at the time the policy is instituted, once he learns of the 
potential exclusion there is no hiding from an intentional act.  At that 
point, refusing to change the policy or to accommodate an individual who 
cannot shave could easily evolve into a case of disparate treatment.  From 
that perspective, the employer’s business rationale for the policy would be 
transformed from part of the disparate impact inquiry into a form of pretext, and 
sticking with the no-beard example, an employer’s assertion of customer 
preference as a justification for the policy is likely to be treated as 
                                                                                                                            
 199. See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE 
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).  McCann documents several places where change 
that initially was sought through litigation was instituted politically, but it is also important to 
note that the comparable worth movement produced significant change in only a few 
jurisdictions, typically quite progressive ones with specific political incentives. 
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insubstantial under either test.200  This does not necessarily mean that all 
such cases will succeed under an intent framework, only that the cases 
would not invariably fare worse under that model.  Accordingly, I argue 
that an expanded definition of intentional discrimination could have 
accomplished nearly all that the disparate impact theory did while also 
reaching forms of subtle or unconscious discrimination that today fre-
quently elude judicial recognition. 
Working to expand the definition of intent also may have changed 
public discourse regarding the continuing effects of discrimination.  It seems 
bewildering to think that the disparate impact theory was created in 1971, 
in part because there was a sense that intentional, or blatant, discrimination 
had receded and a new theory was necessary to capture more subtle 
claims.201  Yet, in the early 1970s and well beyond, there was still plenty of 
familiar intentional discrimination at work, discrimination that may have 
changed in form but that was no less intentional however that term was 
defined.  Nevertheless, once the disparate impact theory emerged on the 
scene, our notion of intent stagnated because disparate impact seemed 
available to do the necessary work of rooting out discrimination.  
Ultimately, we were left with an underdeveloped concept of the most important 
kind of discrimination, intentional discrimination, while possessing a well-
defined but relatively low-utility theory of disparate impact. 
A. The Gains of the Disparate Impact Theory 
The disparate impact theory has had its greatest success in the area of 
testing, but even within this limited context there are many reasons to be 
circumspect of the theory’s ultimate impact.  Most importantly, although 
challenges to written tests produced temporary reform through remedial 
preferential hiring, they have failed to produce tests without disparate 
impact, which was presumably the larger original goal.  Most written exami-
nations today continue to have substantial disparate impact; what has 
changed is that the tests are better constructed, in the sense that they are 
harder to challenge in court because they have been properly validated, but 
                                                                                                                            
 200. To the extent they have been raised, customer preference defenses generally arise in 
the disparate treatment context as part of an inquiry into whether an explicit policy can be 
justified as a bona fide occupational qualification because employers seeking to satisfy customer 
preference will usually do so through an explicit policy.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines 
Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting the airline’s policy of only hiring women as 
flight attendants). 
 201. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 383–89 (discussing justifications for the theory); 
Rosenthal, supra note 84, at 94 (same). 
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not better in the more important sense of being better predictors of per-
formance.202  The ability to predict success in employment, or academic 
potential, has not improved much in the last thirty years as most written 
tests have the same modest ability to predict performance today as they did 
at the time of the Griggs case.203  And despite the many challenges to writ-
ten tests, testing is more prevalent today, not less.204 
In addition to the limited reform of testing the cases ultimately 
brought, most of the claims filed in the early 1970s were successful in sub-
stantial part because so many of the tests were instituted without any vali-
dation effort by employers with a history of discrimination.  Many of the 
early lawsuits were filed against police and fire departments—long bastions 
of white men—that relied on various civil service examinations to hire 
their members.205  Successful lawsuits against private employers were almost 
                                                                                                                            
 202. A recent article noted, “[W]hen CATs [cognitive ability tests] are used for selection, 
either as part of a test battery or as the sole predictor, they virtually guarantee adverse impact 
against Blacks.”  Greg A. Chung-Yan & Steven F. Cronshaw, A Critical Re-examination and 
Analysis of Cognitive Ability Tests Using the Thorndike Model of Fairness, 75 J. OCCUPATIONAL & 
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 489, 490 (2002); see also David Autor & David Scarborough, Will 
Job Testing Harm Minority Workers? (Mass. Inst. of Tech., Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 04-29, 
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=580941 (finding, in a study of a large company, that 
the test had adverse impact but did not reduce levels of hiring among minorities); Sackett et al., 
supra note 15, at 304–12 (discussing the persistence of adverse impact in tests).  A number of years 
ago, I attended a conference on testing where there was a presentation on the California Bar 
Association, which had recently restructured its test to reduce its adverse impact.  What they 
found, however, was what they considered a better test had virtually the exact same adverse 
impact.  While there may be value in creating better tests, that is not typically the purpose of the 
challenges to examinations. 
 203. See PETER SACKS, STANDARDIZED MINDS: THE HIGH PRICE OF AMERICA’S TESTING 
CULTURE AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO CHANGE IT 167–99 (1999) (discussing the limits of 
employment testing); Sackett et al., supra note 15, at 308–10 (discussing correlations on performance 
tests); Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA 
L. REV. 1251, 1265 (1995) (discussing the limited correlation between employment tests and 
performance).  An important study of the effect of affirmative action in the workplace found some 
evidence of lower educational attainments among minority employees but no evidence of lower 
productivity, suggesting a weak correlation between educational attainment and productivity in 
the workplaces studied.  See Harry Holzer & David Neumark, Are Affirmative Action Hires Less 
Qualified?  Evidence From Employer-Employee Data on New Hires, 17 J. LAB. ECON. 534 (1999). 
 204. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, The Use of Personality Tests as a Hiring Tool: Is the Benefit 
Worth the Cost?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 281 (2002) (noting an increase in personality 
tests since the federal ban on polygraph testing); Rod Kurtz, Testing, Testing . . . , INC., June 2004, 
at 35, 36 (noting that the use of employment tests has increased 15 percent each of the last three 
years); Nancy Syverson, Industrial Psychology at Work, INDUS. MAINT. & PLANT OPERATION, 
Apr. 10, 2001, at 16, 17 (discussing the rise in personality testing). 
 205. Some of the early cases involving police departments include Boston Chapter, NAACP, 
Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service 
Commission, 354 F. Supp. 778 (D. Conn. 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 
1973); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1974); and Officers for Justice v. 
Civil Service Commission, 371 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1973).  Influential fire department cases 
Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake? 757 
 
all filed against Southern employers with a history of segregated 
employment.206  In these instances, the disparate impact theory was likely 
unnecessary to establish liability and to render institutional reform.  With 
few exceptions, these cases could have proceeded under a theory of 
intentional discrimination. 
Even so, the testing cases were a success in the immediate sense that 
many employers were required to provide remedial relief to a class of 
employees.  Moreover, other employers likely preferred to administer a bit 
of affirmative action rather than to validate their examinations.  Indeed, 
this has long been the pattern among public employers.  Public pressure to 
diversify police and fire departments, especially in large metropolitan areas 
where many of the testing cases arose, would likely have produced similar 
results even without the pressure of these cases.207 
1. Testing Cases as Intentional Discrimination Claims 
Although written tests now form the paradigmatic disparate impact 
claim, many of those cases could have proceeded under a theory of inten-
tional discrimination, and as noted earlier, some of the early cases were 
based on just such a theory.208  In many early cases, courts found that the use of 
written examinations perpetuated past discrimination in a predictable 
manner and those two facts were frequently sufficient to classify the cases as 
involving intentional discrimination, with present discrimination embodied 
in the apparent desire to preserve past segregation practices.209  This was 
                                                                                                                            
include Vulcan Society of New York City Fire Department, Inc. v. Civil Service Commission, 490 F.2d 387 
(2d Cir. 1973) and Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973), modified and 
aff’d sub. nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973). 
 206. See, e.g., Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding present 
discrimination tied to past practices); Young v. Edgcomb Steel Co., 363 F. Supp. 961 (M.D.N.C. 
1973) (upholding a challenge to the Wonderlic test).  There were obviously exceptions, but the 
vast majority of claims targeted Southern employers and unions.  But see Stamps v. Detroit Edison 
Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (upholding a challenge to written examinations against a 
nonsouthern employer). 
 207. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
 208. Recall that both the Papermakers and Quarles cases, discussed in Part I.A supra, were 
framed as intentional discrimination claims. 
 209. In Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., the district court defined intent in the literal sense 
that the employer meant to do what it did.  319 F. Supp. 314, 320 (E.D. La. 1970).  This was in 
connection with a challenge to a written examination for which the employer “engaged in no 
significant study to support its testing program . . . .”  Id. at 319.  In another case involving a policy 
that prohibited hiring individuals who had been arrested, the court explained:  
An intent to discriminate is not required to be shown so long as the discrimination 
shown is not accidental or inadvertent.  The intentional use of a policy which in fact 
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also true in Griggs, and at this point in the development of employment dis-
crimination doctrine, courts were not focused on the distinction between 
intent and effects, certainly not to the same extent as after the Court cre-
ated that distinction. 
The business necessity test also lent itself to an interpretation of inten-
tional discrimination.  If the employer was able to explain the need for its 
test—if it was able to explain why police officers should have knowledge of 
Shakespeare’s plays as some of the tests required210—it could meet the standard 
for establishing that the test was intended to serve a legitimate business 
purpose and therefore was nondiscriminatory even under an intentional 
discrimination standard.  To the extent the employer was unable to explain 
its need for the test, and at a minimum should have known that the test 
would disqualify or disadvantage African Americans, it was reasonable to 
infer an intent to discriminate.  After all, the employer had been stripped of its 
primary defenses—that it either did not know the test would have an 
adverse impact or that the test was necessary to ensure qualified employees.  
Alternatively, an employer might claim that the test was the least 
expensive means of screening applicants, in which case the cost issue would 
be weighed against the demand for equal treatment.  Accordingly, the 
question would be: Is it a form of intentional discrimination for the 
employer to choose an inexpensive, but not very useful, means of screening 
applicants if that means, and is known to mean, that African Americans 
will largely be excluded from employment opportunities? 211  Again, no leap 
is necessary to label such conduct a form of intentional discrimination. 
                                                                                                                            
discriminates between applicants of different races and can reasonably be seen so to 
discriminate, is interdicted by the statute, unless the employer can show a business necessity for it. 
Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 402–03 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (invalidating the policy 
where the plaintiff had been arrested fourteen times without conviction, thirteen of them before 
1959); see also United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800, 804 (4th Cir. 1970) (“Present 
policies and practices which are discriminatory or which, no matter how neutral in appearance, 
perpetuate the effects of past discrimination are unlawful and should be immediately enjoined.”); 
Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 402, 414 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (“Plaintiffs . . . were 
rejected because of their failure to pass defendant’s discriminatory pre-employment test.  Because 
the test was instituted with knowledge of its adverse impact, and since the test clearly is not valid, 
it cannot provide a legitimate defense.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 758 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 210. Shortly after Griggs, the New York Times described a test used to select steamfitters 
that asked such things as “the relationship between Shakespeare and ‘Othello,’ Dante and the 
‘Inferno’” and noted further, “The aspiring steamfitter also finds himself asked to associate Dali 
with painting.”  Klein, supra note 90. 
 211. In the context of Title VII, the Supreme Court has generally refused to acknowledge cost 
justifications as a legitimate employment justification.  See Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).  In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the Supreme Court suggested 
that cost could be a factor in determining the viability of alternative employment practices, but this 
is an issue that has largely been neglected subsequently.  490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989) (noting that in 
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In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,212 the Supreme Court held 
subsequent to Griggs that knowledge of probable results was insufficient 
to establish a claim of intentional discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause,213 and that restrictive definition might have 
forestalled efforts to treat testing claims under a theory of intentional 
discrimination.  The Court’s Feeney decision, however, was rendered in 
the context of existing law, which at that point defined the 
predictable, but not necessarily intentional, results of employment 
actions as a form of unintentional discrimination.  Had the disparate 
impact theory been unavailable, and had the testing cases evolved as 
part of the doctrine of intentional discrimination, the Court may have 
been more attuned to the elasticity of the concept of intent and may 
have been willing to conceive of a broader definition of intent than 
the test it adopted in Feeney. 
In any event, the Feeney case fits the argument developed above, in 
that it was difficult for the Court to identify the challenged policy as dis-
criminatory. Feeney involved a challenge by women to Massachusetts’s state 
policy of providing a preference to veterans for civil service positions, a 
preference that resulted in a substantial boost for male applicants.214 
Although women had been discriminated against in the military, that 
discrimination had been sanctioned politically and judicially, and it would 
have been a significant stretch for the Court to define the civil service pref-
erence as discriminatory.215  Instead, the Court saw the preference as provid-
ing a benefit for military service much like a military pension, and even 
under a disparate impact framework, the Court would have upheld the 
                                                                                                                            
assessing alternative practices “[f]actors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative 
selection devices are relevant” (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988 
(1988))).  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 seemingly put the issue to rest, and it has not arisen in 
the more recent cases. 
 212. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 213. Id. at 279 (“‘Discriminatory purposes’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent 
as awareness of consequences.”). 
 214. Id. at 259.  The Massachusetts policy was defined as an “absolute” preference because 
qualified veterans were provided an absolute preference over nonveterans, thus ensuring they 
would obtain positions unless they were competing against other veterans.  Id. at 261–63. 
 215. Several years earlier the Supreme Court upheld differential promotion times because of 
the “demonstrable fact that male and female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated 
with respect to opportunities for professional service.”  Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 
(1975).  Two years after Feeney, the Court upheld the male-only draft.  See Rostker v. Goldberg, 
453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
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practice as consistent with business necessity.216  Similarly, in this particular 
case, a broader definition of intent would not have altered the result.217 
It should be clear from this discussion of Feeney that when I suggest that the 
testing cases could have proceeded under a theory of intentional discrimination, I 
am relying on a different definition of intent than what was ultimately 
developed in the Supreme Court.  Here it is important to emphasize that the 
way the doctrine of intent evolved was not a necessary or foreordained 
development, and was a direct product of the division of discrimination into 
intentional and nonintentional classifications.  The only way the situation 
with the early employment tests could not be defined as intentional 
discrimination is if intent is defined narrowly to ask whether the employer 
chose the test with the explicit motive of excluding African Americans.  Yet 
there is little basis for equating intent and motive, as, within the law, motive 
and intent are distinctly different—though frequently overlapping—concepts, 
and the Supreme Court has typically not linked the two.218  What this analysis 
suggests is that the disparate impact theory was borne out of a strikingly 
limited definition of intent, one that turned on proof of animus or motive. 
                                                                                                                            
 216. The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating: “The Federal Government and 
virtually all of the States grant some sort of hiring preference to veterans.”  Feeney, 442 U.S. at 261 
(footnote omitted).  Noting that the preference dated to 1884, the Court explained that it was “a 
measure designed to reward veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to ease the transition 
from military to civilian life, to encourage patriotic service, and to attract loyal and well-
disciplined people to civil service occupations.”  Id. at 265 (footnote omitted). 
 217. If the Court had applied the business necessity test strenuously, it is certainly possible that 
it would have invalidated the practice because there was no obvious or even articulable business 
justification for the preference.  If anything, a veteran’s preference might have led the state to hire 
lesser qualified individuals.  By the same measure, the Court likely would have found the state’s 
interest at stake—rewarding veterans for their service and encouraging others to serve—as 
sufficiently important and connected to state employment that the practice would have been 
upheld, particularly because no ready alternative was apparent other than a different form of 
preference.  Thus, the case might have been more like Beazer, where the Court found the practice 
“assuredly” job related based on “legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency” and 
therefore permitted exclusion of methadone users from some public transit employment.  See New 
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.31 (1979). 
 218. As Professor Rutherglen has pointed out, the best example is found in affirmative 
action cases, which typically do not involve any animus or illicit motive.  See George Rutherglen, 
Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 125 (1995) (“If anything plainly falls under 
the description of intentional discrimination, it is affirmative action.”); see also UAW v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc. 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (invalidating a fetal protection policy despite the employer’s 
lack of animus); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (invalidating a Florida statute designed to 
protect children from private racial bias); Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 
(1978) (invalidating the use of sex-based pension plans under Title VII).  The Supreme Court has 
also not sought to determine whether a defendant was “consciously aware” of his or her motive, 
but instead has typically defined discrimination on a causal model related to disparate treatment.  
See Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005) (finding discrimination in a jury selection process 
based on cumulative circumstantial evidence). 
Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake? 761 
 
To be sure, the testing cases now form an awkward fit within our con-
struct of intentional discrimination, but the reason it is difficult to see the 
use of objective tests as involving claims of intentional discrimination is 
that the idea is now so foreign to us.  For the last thirty years, testing claims 
have proceeded under the disparate impact theory, and in many ways they 
are now defined as the opposite of intent.  Had the disparate impact theory 
been unavailable, the early testing claims would have readily fit within a 
more elastic definition of intent, and it likewise seems inconceivable that 
courts would not have found a means to invalidate tests that failed to pro-
vide useful information regarding employees’ productivity while excluding 
large numbers of minority applicants.  Like any cultural practice, legal concepts 
acquire meaning that, with time, appears to have been inevitable, even 
when we know that the concept was the product of choice and historical 
context.219  Our definition of intentional discrimination today is invariably 
linked to the emergent definition of unintentional discrimination and 
without the latter, the former may have been very different from what we 
now have. 
The real question is not whether the early cases would have fit within 
a broader definition of intentional discrimination but whether testing 
claims would still have been treated as involving intentional discrimination 
as the cases moved farther away from the era of segregation.  On this point, 
one is left with little more than speculation, but it seems that two possibili-
ties were likely.  It is certainly possible that once testing claims were 
defined within our concept of intentional discrimination, courts would 
have continued to treat them as such.  This would be especially true if 
employers were afforded the opportunity to justify their employment prac-
tice under a form of the business necessity test.  This idea may seem 
counterintuitive because the business necessity test developed as part of the 
disparate impact model, and I am now discussing how the law may have 
developed if there had been no disparate impact model.  What I mean to 
suggest is something slightly different, however, namely that the way in which 
the disparate impact model developed around the testing cases is properly 
defined as consistent with a claim of intentional discrimination.  If the 
testing claims had been adjudicated under a disparate treatment framework, a 
form of the business necessity defense still would have been available, but it 
would have been treated as part of the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory 
                                                                                                                            
 219. See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 78–84 (2003) (discussing the meaning and importance of cultural practices). 
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reason under a pretext model of proof.220  In practical terms the employer 
would argue that it did not exclude African Americans because of their 
race, but because they were not qualified in ways measured by the 
examination.  This would then be justified by the information the 
examination was providing. 
An employer also might be charged with intentional discrimination to 
the extent it declined to adopt a less discriminatory alternative without a 
nondiscriminatory justification for doing so.  This is how the law is now 
structured as a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.221  In many ways the 
lesser discriminatory alternative inquiry is a means of proving pretext 
because at the point the alternative is proposed the employer is aware of the 
discriminatory effects of its practices and has the opportunity to remedy 
them without a loss of efficiency.  Declining to adopt the proposed alterna-
tive without an adequate justification should be considered pretextual and 
proof of intentional discrimination.222 
Another possibility is that as the testing cases became farther removed 
from the era of intentionally segregated schools, courts would have 
retreated from analyzing them under an intentional discrimination frame-
work.  Another way of getting at this question is to ask how important the 
emphasis on the inferior education of African Americans was to the Griggs 
decision.223  If it was important, as I believe it was, then courts may have 
altered their analysis once educational inequities were no longer seen as the 
source of the continuing disparities to the same extent as was apparent at 
the time of Griggs.224  Without this foundation, it may have been more 
                                                                                                                            
 220. Developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the pretext 
model is the primary means to prove intent through circumstantial evidence.  The model is 
designed to demonstrate that the employer’s asserted rationale for an employment decision is a pretext 
for discrimination.  See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. 
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
 221. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).  In the context of written examinations, a frequently 
proposed lesser discriminatory alternative is to change the scoring method, either to a pass/fail system 
or to a lower cut-off score.  Even though the concept of a lesser discriminatory alternative arose in 
Albemarle Paper, relatively few cases have explored the concept.  See, e.g., Bryant v. City of Chicago, 
200 F.3d 1092, 1094–95, 1102 (7th Cir. 2000) (accepting the plaintiff’s suggestion of combining 
rank order promotions with “merit” promotions as a less discriminatory alternative). 
 222. See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting in the context of 
alternative practices that “[e]ven if the employer successfully defends the business necessity of the 
practice, the plaintiff may still prevail if she can show that the employer’s proffered explanation 
was merely a pretext for discrimination”). 
 223. 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (“Because they are Negroes, petitioners have long received 
inferior education in segregated schools . . . .”). 
 224. This is arguably what has happened in the education cases, particularly among the 
conservative members on the Court who have a difficult time assigning current educational 
disparities to unlawful discrimination.  See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 506 (1992) 
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difficult to cast the testing cases as claims of intentional discrimination, and 
in suggesting that the disparate impact theory may have been a mistake, it is 
important to acknowledge the possibility that many testing claims would not 
have succeeded under an intentional discrimination framework.  Never-
theless, accepting my analysis above, most testing cases could have proceeded 
as claims of intentional discrimination through at least the mid-1980s, and it 
is only in the latter time period when the testing cases would have been in 
jeopardy.  As documented earlier, there have been remarkably fewer testing 
cases in the last fifteen years, and courts increasingly have accepted employer 
justifications for their practices.225  This may be attributable to the 
increasingly conservative nature of the judiciary, but it also may be the result 
of a conviction that the disparate impact model had outlasted its purpose. 
2. Politics and the Disparate Impact Theory 
Not only could many of the testing cases have succeeded under a broader 
definition of intent, but social and political pressures would likely have produced 
a similar demand for change.  The largest segment of testing cases involved 
public employers, primarily in large metropolitan areas, including police and fire 
departments.226  Many of these cases were successful, but in most jurisdictions 
comparable political pressure would have likely served the same function. 
                                                                                                                            
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“At some time, we must acknowledge that it has become absurd to 
assume, without any further proof, that violations of the Constitution dating from the days when 
Lyndon Johnson was President, or earlier, continue to have an appreciable effect upon current 
operation of schools.”).  For a discussion of the Court’s more recent education doctrine, see 
Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157 (2000). 
 225. See cases cited supra notes 156–157; see also Allen v. City of Chicago, 351 F.3d 306, 316 
(7th Cir. 2003) (finding that the plaintiffs conceded the validity of an assessment center, but 
rejecting a proposed alternative as equally valid); Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 308 F.3d 286 
(3d Cir. 2002) (finding a physical agility test valid under the business necessity test); Bew v. City 
of Chicago, 252 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001) (upholding a police 
certification examination); Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 
2000) (en banc) (upholding a teacher certification test under the business necessity test); Hearn 
v. City of Jackson, 340 F. Supp. 2d 728 (S.D. Miss. 2003), aff’d, 110 F. App’x 424 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(determining a police test to be content valid).  The successful challenges to tests tended to involve 
validating cut-off scores, as opposed to the underlying test itself.  See Isabel v. City of Memphis, 404 F.3d 
404 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding a cut-off score on a police lieutenant test not properly validated); 
Green v. Town of Hamden, 73 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Conn. 1999) (granting a preliminary injunction 
because the employer offered no justification for a specific cut-off score); United States v. 
Delaware, No. 01-020-KAJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4560 (D. Del. Mar 22, 2004) (finding a cut-off 
score set improperly high); see also Johnson v. City of Memphis, 355 F. Supp. 2d 911 (W.D. Tenn. 
2005) (finding that the city offered no proof the test was job related). 
 226. A survey of testing cases found that police and fire departments were the most 
prominent defendants, with three times as many lawsuits filed against public than private 
employers.  See Paul Burstein & Susan Pitchford, Social-Scientific and Legal Challenges to Education 
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Black mayors ascended to power in the 1970s, at about the time the 
lawsuits were filed, and immediately began to alter city hiring practices.  For 
example, during Maynard Jackson’s first two terms as mayor in Atlanta, the 
percentage of African American municipal employees doubled, and nearly 
three-quarters of the city’s new police recruits were African Americans.227  
Other cities experienced comparably rapid integration in municipal employ-
ment, including Detroit and Chicago, where longstanding discrimination 
lawsuits have helped alter the makeup of the police and fire departments in a 
manner consistent with the political agenda within those cities.228  The 
political interests of the city bureaucracies also prompted many cities to allow 
the consent decrees that emerged from litigation to stay in place far longer 
than was typically necessary to remedy the underlying discrimination.  In the 
last few years, the Boston police and fire departments were ordered to dissolve 
remedial hiring plans that had been in place for thirty years.  Both 
departments had allowed the decrees to persist even after the original 
remedial goals had been obtained.229  Chicago likewise continues to rely on its 
consent decree to maintain diversity in its departments.230 
The experience in Washington, D.C. illustrates how committed 
departments were able to integrate their municipal workforces even absent 
                                                                                                                            
and Test Requirements in Employment, 37 SOC. PROBS. 243, 250–51 (1990).  The authors also noted 
that when defendants offered validation efforts, the tests typically were upheld.  Id. at 252–53. 
 227. Ronald H. Bayor, African-American Mayors and Governance in Atlanta, in AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
MAYORS: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE AMERICAN CITY 178, 181–83 (David R. Colburn & Jeffrey 
S. Adler eds., 2001). 
 228. The efforts to diversify police and fire departments have generated an enormous 
amount of litigation, most of it filed by disgruntled white employees.  See Petit v. City of Chicago, 
352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding a promotional plan in the police department); 
Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding police promotions in part 
as a means to satisfy the department’s operational needs); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 
1219 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding fire department promotions); Billish v. City of Chicago, 989 F.2d 
890 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (allowing the plaintiff’s challenge of a scoring plan to reduce 
scoring disparities to survive summary judgment motion).  Detroit was ordered to end its one-for-
one hiring scheme in 1993, almost nineteen years after it commenced.  See Detroit Police Officers 
Ass’n v. Young, 989 F.2d 225 (6th Cir. 1993).  Consistent with his own political goals, and aided 
by the presence of the consent decree, Mayor Coleman Young produced significant change 
throughout city government.  See Jeffrey S. Adler, Introduction, in AFRICAN-AMERICAN MAYORS, 
supra note 227, at 1, 14 (“During Coleman Young’s first four years in office . . . the proportion of 
administrative positions held by African Americans in Detroit increased by 94 percent.”).  When 
Tom Bradley became Mayor of Los Angeles, his first Executive Order, issued immediately after his 
swearing in, created an affirmative action plan, and the presence of minority officers doubled 
during his regime.  See Heather R. Parker, Tom Bradley and the Politics of Race, in AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
MAYORS, supra note 227, at 153, 161–63. 
 229. See Quinn v. City of Boston, 325 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (fire department decree); 
Deleo v. City of Boston, No. 03-12538-PBS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24034 (D. Mass. Nov. 23, 2004) 
(police department decree). 
 230. See, e.g., Reynolds, 296 F.3d. at 530–31. 
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a successful legal challenge.  After the challenge to the hiring test failed in 
Washington v. Davis, the city voluntarily opted to implement affirmative 
action measures to remedy the examination’s disparate effects, which, under 
civil service rules, continued to be administered citywide.  White firefighters 
filed suit to block those efforts, and based on the failed challenge in Davis, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the affirmative action plan because 
there was no legal need to remedy the effects of what had been determined 
to be a valid examination.231  Without the original challenge, the 
administration may have had alternative means to implement voluntary 
affirmative action.  In any event, the city’s affirmative action program was 
in place for a decade, and for many years now the city has had a black 
police chief and black officers comprise two-thirds of the force.232  In most 
metropolitan areas, the substantial political pressure to diversify the police 
force, and to a lesser extent, fire departments, would likely have achieved 
much of the changes the testing challenges produced.233 
Where the testing challenges may have helped is in providing a means 
to avoid strict civil service rules that otherwise may have frustrated affirma-
tive action measures, although during this period many jurisdictions altered 
their civil service rules to allow for greater diversity.234  The lawsuits also 
provided a vehicle for resisting white union opposition to integrating the 
departments, and in both respects, the testing challenges may have been 
important procedural devices to achieve desired political goals.  This is con-
sistent with the story that has emerged from the law and society scholarship 
focusing on how personnel departments frequently seize on legal rules to 
                                                                                                                            
 231. See Hammon v. Barry, 813 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reh’g denied, 826 F.2d 73 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987), vacated, 841 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  Although the case itself involved firefighters, 
the test at issue was the same test employed in Washington v. Davis, and it appeared that the 
affirmative action policy applied citywide.  Hammon, 813 F.2d. at 417. 
 232. See Petula Dvorak et al., Ramsey’s No. 2 Is Ranked No. 1 in Unpopularity, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 29, 2001, at A1 (noting that police chief “Ramsey and about 65 percent of the force are 
black”).  In the late 1980s, 53 percent of the force was black.  Jacqueline Trescott, The Mayor’s 
Forceful Critic, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1989, at D1.  In 1973, the Washington, D.C. Police 
Department also became the first police department to give women the same duties as men.  See 
Brian Reilly, Women Make a Place in Man’s World of Policing, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1994, at C10. 
 233. A study of forty-six metropolitan police departments found that the presence of a black 
mayor was the most significant variable associated with black individuals among sworn police 
officers.  See William G. Lewis, Toward Representative Bureaucracy: Blacks in City Police 
Organizations, 1975–1985, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 257, 262 (1989).  The study also concluded that 
a black mayor was significantly more important than the existence of a consent decree.  Id. 
 234. See RUFUS P. BROWNING ET AL., PROTEST IS NOT ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE OF 
BLACKS AND HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN POLITICS 174 (1984) (“Many cities changed 
final selection rules to reduce the weight given to test results and to make it easier for affirmative 
action objectives to affect the final hiring decision.”). 
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serve their own institutional goals.  In addition to the work of Michael 
McCann noted earlier, Lauren Edelman and Frank Dobbin have docu-
mented the ways in which personnel officers have manipulated the law, 
often by exaggerating its mandate to serve their own goals of restructuring 
discriminatory hierarchies while carving out a distinct role for personnel 
departments in managing the law.235  This was true, Dobbin suggests, with 
sexual harassment policies, and Lauren Edelman has demonstrated how per-
sonnel officers frequently inflate the risk of constructive discharge lawsuits 
to institute due process measures in the workplace.236 
Here, too, the disparate impact theory may have proved a useful conduit 
to integrate workplaces independent of the success of the legal claims.  
Even so, the disparate impact theory was merely a piece of a more compli-
cated, and multifaceted, push for diversity, and its role seems to have been 
at most a supporting one.  Personnel journals did not trumpet the impor-
tance of validated tests or other practices, nor did they discuss the power of 
the disparate impact theory in contexts outside of testing.237  Lauren Edelman 
and others have emphasized the importance of Executive Order 11246 and 
the accompanying affirmative action mandate on federal contractors as 
playing a central role in moving organizations towards embracing 
                                                                                                                            
 235. Lauren Edelman writes: “[B]ecause of normative pressure from their legal 
environments, organizations do not simply ignore or circumvent weak law, but rather construct 
compliance in a way that, at least in part, fits their interests.”  Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity 
and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1541 
(1992) [hereinafter Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures].  Elsewhere she has termed 
her model a “legal environment theory” which she defines as: “[T]he legal environment theory 
posits an important indirect effect of law on organizations: law creates, and helps to constitute, a 
normative environment to which organizations must adapt.”  Lauren B. Edelman, Legal 
Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the American 
Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401, 1402 (1990). 
 236. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of 
Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47 (1992) (documenting the inflated threat of 
constructive discharge law advanced by personnel officers); Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, How to Stop 
Harassment: A Tale of Two Professions, A Tale of Two Sectors (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the author). 
 237. In their work, both Dobbin and Edelman review personnel journals to identify trends 
relevant to professionals.  See Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: 
Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406 (1999); Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 
236, at 13–16.  I have reviewed the Social Sciences Index and Human Resources Abstracts, as 
well as several personnel journals and conducted many online searches, finding only a small 
sample of articles discussing testing.  See also David E. Robertson, Update on Testing and Equal 
Opportunity, 56 PERSONNEL J. 144 (1977); David E. Robertson, Employment Testing and 
Discrimination, 54 PERSONNEL J. 18 (1975) (four page article); Cary D. Thorp, Jr., Fair Employment 
Practices: The Compliance Jungle, 52 PERSONNEL J. 642 (1973) (one of eight pages involves testing 
but not validation).  There is also a related symposium on affirmative action in 34 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 234 (1974). 
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affirmative action goals.238  Furthermore, in his recent history of civil rights 
statutes, John Skretny consigns Griggs and the disparate impact theory to a 
supporting role.239  This is not to say that the disparate impact theory played no 
role in diversifying workplaces, only that it was part of a larger confluence 
of events that came together in the 1970s.240  As such, the limited gains 
produced by the theory may have been achieved even without the background 
threat of disparate impact lawsuits, especially if the threat of such suits had 
been replaced with the potentially greater threat of intentional discrimination 
lawsuits.  As discussed below, intentional discrimination lawsuits carry 
stronger moral authority and would have generated more intense social and 
political pressure to eliminate workplace inequalities.241 
B. The Mistake in the Disparate Impact Theory 
This returns us to the failings of the disparate impact theory, which is 
not just a failing to produce more substantial results, but also a failing of our 
understanding of how the law so often tracks and preserves the status quo.  
The central mistake behind the disparate impact theory was a belief that 
                                                                                                                            
 238. See Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures, supra note 235, at 1542–43 
(discussing the role Executive Order 11246 played in creating institutional structures to manage 
equal employment law).  Executive Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965), which 
requires affirmative measures from federal contractors, has been the focus of a number of studies by 
economists, most of whom have concluded that it contributed significantly to employment gains for 
African Americans and women in the 1970s, despite rather lax enforcement efforts.  See, e.g., James J. 
Heckman & Kenneth I. Wolpin, Does the Contract Compliance Program Work? An Analysis of Chicago 
Data, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 544 (1976); Jonathan S. Leonard, The Impact of Affirmative Action 
on Employment, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 439 (1984); Jonathan S. Leonard, The Impact of Affirmative Action 
Regulation and Equal Employment Law on Black Employment, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 47 (1990). 
 239. See JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, 
CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 166–71 (1996).  In his more recent work, Professor 
Skrentny mentioned the theory only in passing.  See JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 126 (2002) (noting that the EEOC had created a definition of discrimination that 
did not depend on intent). 
 240. This is consistent with the conclusion of Paul Burstein and Mark Evan Edwards, who 
found that court litigation was one factor in contributing to the improvement in the earnings of 
African American men during the 1970s.  See Paul Burstein & Mark Evan Edwards, The Impact of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation on Racial Disparity in Earnings: Evidence and Unresolved Issues, 28 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 79 (1994). 
 241. The disparate impact theory might have also helped shift social norms through what is 
sometimes defined as the expressive function of the law, in which the law operates, in part, by the 
statements it makes.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2021 (1996).  But for that to have been the case, the disparate impact theory would have 
had to, at a minimum, reach the public either through employers or a broader group.  There is no 
reason to believe the disparate impact theory has become part of our social culture, and in fact, 
our continuing division over affirmative action where substantial majorities of the population 
deride a cultural emphasis on equal results. 
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the law could do the work of social change when, in fact, much of the battle 
to remedy discrimination was lost when we moved away from the focus on 
intent.  Rather than a new theory of discrimination, what was needed was a 
more expansive definition of intent—one that would have highlighted the 
reality that discrimination was a present experience rather than one of the 
distant past.  The disparate impact theory sent the opposite message, and 
once the theory was carved out, the push to expand the scope of the dispa-
rate impact cause of action came at the expense of a theory of intent.  The 
fault behind the disparate impact theory can perhaps best be exposed by 
evaluating its various justifications. 
1. The Disparate Impact Theory Is Easier to Prove 
The principal justification for the disparate impact theory has always 
been the difficulty of proving intentional discrimination, which necessarily 
implies that the disparate impact theory can be easier to establish.242  Yet, 
the notion that disparate impact theory would alleviate some of the proof 
difficulties that arise with disparate treatment claims ignores the very reason 
why intentional discrimination is so difficult to prove.  Intentional 
discrimination is difficult to prove not because the evidence of intent is 
lacking, but because the evidence that exists, chiefly circumstantial in nature, 
is inconsistent with our societal vision of discrimination.  Absent the 
smoking gun, racial epithets, or other explicit exclusionary practices, it has 
been, and remains, hard to convince courts that intentional discrimination 
exists.  It was, and is, difficult to get courts to draw the necessary inference 
of discrimination.243  This is not a problem that is resolved by a turn to the 
disparate impact theory; if anything, the disparate impact theory 
compounds the problem, and there was never any reason to believe it would 
be easier for courts to make an inference of discrimination once they were 
told that intent was an unnecessary element of proof.  In other words, if 
intentional discrimination is difficult to prove with existing circumstantial 
evidence, labeling unintended adverse effects as discrimination would prove 
a far more difficult proposition for society to embrace. 
                                                                                                                            
 242. Generally this claim is implicit, but some have stated more clearly that disparate 
impact claims are easier to prove.  See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 21 (“Disparate impact is 
easier to establish than disparate treatment.”). 
 243. See Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365, 2418 
(2003) (book review) (“The simple truth is that once Bull Connor and Lester Maddox are gone, 
once angry parents are not screaming, ‘Two, four, six, eight, we don’t want to integrate,’ and once 
spittle isn’t running down the faces of civil rights protesters, it is hard to say precisely what 
discrimination means.”). 
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To illustrate this point, let me return to the Watson case.  The district 
court ruled against Ms. Watson’s intentional discrimination claim even 
though she had been passed over for promotion four times, and in each 
instance those promotions went to white individuals, some with less work 
experience.244  In addition, one of the managers had stated that the teller 
position “was a big responsibility with ‘a lot of money . . . for blacks to have 
to count.’”245 A court that does not see discrimination amidst such 
circumstantial evidence would have an equally hard time identifying dis-
crimination based on adverse effects that were, by definition, unintentional.  
Even if a statistical disparate impact could be shown, the court would likely 
accept the employer’s practices as justified, just as it found the employer’s 
practice nondiscriminatory. 
At this point, one might wonder: Doesn’t the doctrine make a differ-
ence?  Presumably one of the reasons the disparate impact theory has been 
so attractive to those who have sought to extend its reach is because the 
doctrine is perceived as establishing a test that is easier for plaintiffs to sat-
isfy.  There are several problems with this presumption.  First, only the ini-
tial part of the disparate impact theory—namely establishing a statistically 
significant impact—arguably can be considered an easier step to meet, and 
only in those circumstances in which there is a sufficiently large and diverse 
population that is affected by the challenged practice.  The business necessity 
part of the test has never been especially easy for plaintiffs to satisfy, and 
without the established standards that govern testing claims, the judicial 
determination is almost entirely subjective in nature, leaving courts to 
make normative judgments regarding the merits of the challenged practice.  
As discussed above, courts routinely defer to employer practices in making 
those judgments, as we would expect, because courts typically are reluctant 
to identify ambiguous behavior as discriminatory.  That is true whether or 
not intent is a required element of proof. 
Consider some of the leading contemporary controversies and whether 
they lend themselves to objective determinations.  Are so many African 
Americans in prison because they commit too much crime or because the 
criminal justice system treats them unfairly and discriminatorily?  Are 
women failing to achieve greater success in the workplace because they 
prefer childrearing, or are employers treating them differently, offering 
fewer opportunities, and perhaps creating conditions that make nonmarket 
                                                                                                                            
 244. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing 
promotions and noting that one of those selected had significantly less experience). 
 245. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988). 
770 53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 701 (2006) 
 
work particularly appealing?  Are African Americans pulled over in their 
cars so frequently because of racial stereotypes or bias, or because of par-
ticular traffic patterns?  When we observe various racial disparities from 
high unemployment rates to differential test scores, or when we see no 
women infiltrating traditionally male jobs, how do we know whether socie-
tal pressure, discrimination, cultural factors, or some combination best 
explains the landscape that we observe?  And if the observed disparities are 
not the product of employer discrimination, why should they be held liable 
for those disparities? 
One’s answer to all of these questions is not likely to turn on whether 
strict scrutiny or a rational basis review is applied—or whether a theory of 
intent or impact is used.  One’s answer will depend on how much dis-
crimination he or she sees in the world, how one interprets ambiguous acts 
that are subject to varying interpretations.  To move courts to see more dis-
crimination would take much more than a new theory or label; it would 
require persuading them that discrimination explains the observed 
disparities—but this is precisely the kind of judicial discussion we so rarely 
have experienced.246 
I do not mean to suggest that the doctrine never makes a difference, and 
certainly in the disparate impact context the doctrine did make a difference 
in the testing cases.  But even that exception held true for only a limited 
time.  As employers became more sophisticated in their tests, and as the 
cases moved farther away from the era of overt discrimination, even the 
testing cases began to fail because it became more difficult for courts to 
interpret the practices as discriminatory.247  More to the point, for the disparate 
impact theory to have been accepted as a legitimate form of discrimination, 
it would have been necessary to develop a justification consistent with our 
commitment to racial equality.  As noted, no such justification was 
advanced in the seminal cases of Griggs and Washington v. Davis.  The 
parties instead focused too closely on the doctrinal development under the 
                                                                                                                            
 246. Two recent cases in other contexts illustrate the importance of the persistence of 
discrimination, and also suggest how the Supreme Court identifies discrimination among 
complicated circumstantial evidence.  Last term, the Court found that a death row inmate had 
established discrimination in his jury selection, reversing a determination by the lower court and 
reviewing the record with substantial care.  Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005).  
Similarly, in what was the final chapter in a lengthy voting rights dispute, the Supreme Court 
found that an unusually shaped district had been drawn for predominantly political rather than 
racial reasons, and again reviewed the evidence with great care to determine the nondiscriminatory 
rationale.  See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).  Both cases were decided by closely 
divided courts, with Justice Thomas issuing vigorous dissenting opinions in both. 
 247. See cases cited supra note 225. 
Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake? 771 
 
mistaken belief that the doctrine could produce results independent of our 
social and political commitments. Yet, the problem with antidiscrimination 
law has not been in the doctrine but in our limited commitment to 
remedying racial and gender inequities.  One way we have solidified that 
limited commitment is by seeing less discrimination, not more, and in the 
courts this tendency has often manifested itself by attributing racial and 
gender inequities to societal discrimination, a term the Supreme Court has 
used to define discrimination for which no one is held responsible.248  Here, 
too, we can identify another difficulty with the disparate impact theory—it 
sees more discrimination, not less.  Unless there is a focus on intentional 
discrimination, the disparate impact theory appears to seek to remedy 
societal discrimination, which runs up against the Supreme Court’s 
consistent reluctance to permit, let alone require, efforts designed to tackle 
societal discrimination.249 
Although this is not the place for an extended discussion, the difficulty 
I have identified with the disparate impact theory, namely the absence of a 
justification grounded in a theory of discrimination, may also explain why 
the disability statute has been interpreted in a similarly restricted fashion.  
Like the disparate impact theory, the Americans With Disabilities Act arose 
without a significant justification grounded in a theory of discrimination, and 
was in many respects a statute with a principal concern of transferring social 
welfare responsibilities from the federal government to private employers.250  
Although the statute had little public opposition and broad political 
                                                                                                                            
 248. The question of societal discrimination typically arises in the affirmative action 
context where the Court has rejected a desire to remedy societal discrimination as a justification 
for governmental affirmative action.  See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 
(1986) (plurality opinion) (“This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is 
sufficient to justify a racial classification.”), and id. at 288 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“‘[S]ocietal’ discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to 
its own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster under 
strict scrutiny.”). 
 249. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth 
Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 2013 (2000) (“The Court has been adamant . . . that the 
remedy of mere ‘societal discrimination’ is not a compelling state interest that justifies voluntary 
affirmative action programs.”).  Although the concept of societal discrimination has been most 
prominent in affirmative action cases, a similar concern regarding liability and responsibility runs 
throughout the disparate impact theory.  See Selmi, supra note 126, at 1600–01. 
 250. Although there were a number of diverse motives for the statute, the transferring of 
responsibilities was a primary one, as was a desire to overcome stereotypes regarding the abilities of 
those with disabilities.  For a discussion of the welfare reform link, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Americans With Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2003).  See also 
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as 
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004) (discussing the history of the disability 
movement and purposes behind the statute). 
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support, the public support was thin, particularly when it came to protecting 
individuals without what are sometimes defined as core disabilities—those 
individuals, who for example, have bad eyesight, are allergic to perfume, or 
suffer from work-related injuries like carpal tunnel syndrome.251  Without a 
reason to treat these cases as involving discrimination, courts, especially the 
Supreme Court, have been rather quick to dismiss the cases.  For their part, 
rather than offering an underlying theory of disability, plaintiffs have sought 
to define disability by pointing to the statutory language.  But, as has been 
true in so many of the cases we have explored, courts need more than a 
statutory explanation or definition, particularly when that statute allows 
discretion for normative judgments.  At the same time, courts have been far 
more protective of individuals with serious disabilities.252 
In contrast, the testing cases fit our conception of discrimination 
because there is a basic element of unfairness in the use of unvalidated 
examinations to exclude African Americans or others.  When a test has not 
been properly validated, or even more clearly when an employer has not 
made any efforts at validation, the employer has no reason to believe its test is 
providing valuable information.  As the petitioners noted in Griggs, “The 
only thing that Duke [Power] could have known for certain about its tests 
was that they had a highly adverse impact on black workers.”253  In other 
words, this is the very definition of arbitrariness and unfairness, and that is 
one reason why the testing cases have gained acceptance when no other 
area has.254 
In lieu of the disparate impact theory, what was needed was a broad 
social movement designed to delineate the many ways in which intentional 
discrimination—defined so as not to be limited to animus-based 
discrimination—continues to influence life choices for so many individuals, 
                                                                                                                            
 251. See Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (defining disability to make 
cases of carpal tunnel syndrome extremely difficult); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 
(1999) (holding, in a case of two women with poor eyesight, that defining disability takes into 
account mitigating measures).  For one of the perfume cases, see Keck v. N.Y. State Office of 
Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 10 F. Supp. 2d 194 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a perfume allergy claim). 
 252. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that an asymptomatic HIV-
positive individual was covered by the statute).  For a related argument, see Samuel Issacharoff & 
Justin Nelson, Discrimination With a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate 
the Americans With Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 311 (2001). 
 253. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 76, at 48. 
 254. See Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in “General Ability” Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 1157, 1247 (1991) (“[T]he use of low-validity tests in a setting in which blacks do much worse 
on tests generates unacceptable levels of false negatives among minority group applicants, preventing 
far too many capable applicants from getting jobs at which they would actually succeed.”). 
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particularly minorities and women.  Without a sense that discrimination 
was pervasive, it was simply too difficult for courts to see discrimination 
other than in the obvious. 
2. The Law Should Move Away From a Focus on Blame 
In addition to the idea that disparate impact discrimination would be 
easier to prove than intentional discrimination, a related justification for 
the theory was that it would be important, and in some respects strategically 
advantageous, to move away from a theory of liability that was tied to moral 
blame.  As noted previously, there was some sense that moving away from 
intent and blame—the two were intertwined—might make it easier to 
resolve cases voluntarily because the defendant would not be labeled as a 
discriminating entity.  Some scholars have also sought to focus on remedial 
aspects of employment discrimination independent of the blameworthiness 
of the particular conduct,255 and some of that desire is present in the current 
focus on institutional discrimination.  From this perspective, the argument 
is that the employer has not necessarily intended the consequences of its 
action, but it nevertheless would be socially desirable to remedy them as a 
way of reducing the observed disparities.  Susan Sturm has recently made 
such an argument in the context of Home Depot’s practices that caused 
significant statistical disparities in women’s assignments.256  The recent 
focus in the literature on what is generally defined as subtle discrimination 
also typically divorces remedial necessity from the moral blameworthiness 
of the conduct.257 
Just as was true with the argument that the disparate impact theory 
would be easier to prove, the desire to avoid blameworthiness misunderstood 
the crucial role blame plays in fostering a willingness to remedy dis-
crimination.  Without an element of blameworthiness, there is no basis on 
which to require remedial action.  Even in the educational setting, where 
blame is perhaps easiest to assess, once the Supreme Court moved away 
from an immediate locus of blame, it had an increasingly difficult time 
                                                                                                                            
 255. This argument has been developed most extensively by David Benjamin Oppenheimer, 
Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993).  See also Flagg, supra note 10, at 988–89 
(arguing that we should avoid the issue of blaming in antidiscrimination law).  While I share the 
goal of Professors Oppenheimer and Flagg, and would readily sign on to the liability regime they 
propose, I think they are overly optimistic regarding the ability of courts to make inferences of 
discrimination without a connection to blameworthiness. 
 256. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 509–19 (2001). 
 257. See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
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assigning liability or requiring remedial action.258  The key then was not to 
abandon blameworthiness but to expand its core, and that could only be done 
within the confines of a theory of intentional discrimination because, as 
noted above, the two concepts—intent and blame—go hand in hand and 
both needed to be expanded.  For example, in the case of Home Depot, or 
more recently Wal-Mart, we ought to consider the employer blameworthy 
for the results of its employment practices, none of which were accidental 
or unintentional in any sense of the word.  The employers were surely aware 
of the patterns their practices produced; anyone who walked into a Home 
Depot or Wal-Mart would find women working the cash registers rather 
than in the manager’s office.259  The employer might offer defenses to the 
allegations, likely focusing on the particular interests of women, but those 
are defenses to allegations of intentional discrimination, not defenses that 
require the disparate impact edifice, and not defenses that render dis-
crimination impossibly elusive as is so often claimed in the recent literature 
on structural discrimination.260  What is at stake in these cases is convincing 
courts that women did not choose their fate, and that discrimination did.  
Moving away from notions of blame may help produce voluntary 
settlements, but in the context of litigation it likely only bolsters the defendant’s 
claims that the observed patterns are not the product of unlawful discrimination. 
The turn away from blame was even more problematic in that it implied 
that intentional discrimination was a thing of the past.  As early as in the 
briefs filed in the Griggs case, advocates asserted that blatant abuses had 
                                                                                                                            
 258. The most obvious example involved Detroit’s effort to implement a desegregation plan 
that would reach into the surrounding suburbs where many whites had moved.  But because the 
Court did not identify any party responsible for the residential patterns, and did not see any 
discrimination in the way the district lines were drawn, it invalidated the plan.  See Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 259. The cases against Home Depot and Wal-Mart allege that women are relegated to 
positions, such as working the cash registers, that typically do not lead to promotional 
opportunities.  A similar series of cases against grocery stores likewise alleged that women were 
predominantly assigned to positions as cashiers or in the delicatessen, while men tended to work 
in the meat and produce departments where management opportunities arose.  For a discussion of 
these cases, see Selmi, supra note 172, at 18–23.  For a recent account of the allegations against 
Wal-Mart, see LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR 
WORKERS’ RIGHTS AT WAL-MART (2004). 
 260. In an influential article, Ian F. Haney López has profiled the grand jury selection 
process in the 1960s as an example of what he calls institutional racism.  Ian F. Haney López, 
Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 
(2000).  As he explains, local judges at the time selected grand jurors and did so based on their 
own personal contacts, a process that led to overwhelmingly white juries.  This seems an unusual 
example because even though the judges may not have expressed any conscious animus, the 
process should have been subject to a statistical challenge relating to intentional discrimination.  
This is another example of an author equating intent, and blameworthy conduct, with animus. 
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receded, subtly equating intent with those blatant abuses.261  As noted 
previously, this was a strategic move unique to the employment dis-
crimination field; in other areas, the subtle ways in which intentional dis-
crimination manifested itself were treated as forms of intentional 
discrimination, at least into the early 1970s.262  Yet, at about that time, 
something changed dramatically, symbolized by the move to diversity 
within affirmative action, a move that quickly became disengaged from 
intentional discrimination.  As we saw in the recent affirmative action case 
involving the University of Michigan Law School, the move to diversity 
has been a way to preserve the status quo with some modest tinkering, and 
it has also been a way for us to view discrimination as increasingly a past 
phenomenon.263  Consistent with the desire to shed moral blameworthiness, 
affirmative action has generally been a voluntary act and one that is neither 
tied to blame nor to discrimination. 
Finally, we lose something important when we take discrimination out 
of the picture.  Without discrimination, remedying observed disparities is 
dependent on the good faith of employers interested in diversity or, alterna-
tively, discrimination becomes just another tort free of the moral baggage that 
attaches to claims of discrimination.  Discrimination, however, is not just 
another tort—it is not accidental, something to be limited or insured against.  
Discrimination, even in its less blatant forms, is a potent evil, one that has 
deep historical and societal roots that we should strive to overcome rather 
than to absorb into the fabric of society.  That is one reason why it is important 
to preserve an element of blame and to expand the scope of blameworthy 
conduct; otherwise we might find our will to remedy discrimination limited 
by our perception that discrimination is no longer a central social problem. 
                                                                                                                            
 261. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 76, at 25 (noting that “outright and open exclusion 
of Negroes is passé”). 
 262. See cases supra note 75. 
 263. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  A number of scholars recently have 
commented on the resonance between the Supreme Court’s decision and public opinion.  For 
example, Jack Balkin has written:  
When large corporations inform the Court that affirmative action is necessary for 
competitiveness in global capitalism, and when members of the military insist that 
affirmative action is necessary for national security, it is clear that race conscious 
affirmative action in education is no radical nostrum of the left but is thoroughly and 
utterly mainstream. 
Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 
1719 (2005).  Professor Toni Massaro adds: “[T]he Court juggled complex doctrinal and practical 
concerns and sought to create as little disruption as possible.  It deferred to educator, military, and 
business leaders’ opinions about real-world consequences.”  Toni M. Massaro, Constitutional Law as 
“Normal Science,” 21 CONST. COMMENT. 547, 550 (2004). 
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3. The Limitations of Intent 
I have already suggested some of the ways the creation of the disparate 
impact theory contributed to a limited definition of intentional dis-
crimination, and in this final section I expand that argument to demonstrate 
what might have been lost in the pursuit of a theory designed to avoid an 
inquiry into intent.  Recall that the disparate impact theory arrived first in the 
development of employment discrimination, with the McDonnell-Douglas 
disparate treatment framework following two years later.  From the 
beginning of the doctrinal development, there was a push to expand the 
disparate impact theory to cover most routine claims of discrimination.  
Yet, the effort to expand the theory led to judicial neglect of the disparate 
treatment theory, and also created the false impression that disparate treatment 
equaled animus.  Two cases, one that followed shortly after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis and another more recent case, 
illustrate the connection between an expansive interpretation of the impact 
theory and a limited theory of intent. 
In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,264 the plaintiffs challenged the 
employer’s practice of only hiring those familiar to the project manager, or 
who were recommended by current employees, rather than through a formal 
application procedure or among those who appeared for work at the job-
site.265  This practice resulted in a disproportionately white workforce, and 
the plaintiffs challenged the practice under both intentional and impact 
theories, urging that the employer’s practice be subjected to business necessity 
scrutiny.  The court of appeals applied a disparate impact analysis, holding 
for the plaintiffs and imposing a particularly restrictive interpretation of the 
business necessity test that required the employer to establish that its 
practice was the best means of hiring new employees.266  Although this 
determination may seem extreme, it was a natural extension of the dis-
parate impact theory into subjective employment practices because it would 
be difficult for a court to assess the necessity of the employer’s practices 
without some anchor like a best practice theory.  The standard adopted by 
the court was more onerous than what the Supreme Court had previously 
established and was likely to tolerate.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
reversed the appellate court, categorically rejecting the requirement that an 
                                                                                                                            
 264. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
 265. Id. at 570. 
 266. Waters v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 551 F.2d 1085, 1089–90 (7th Cir. 1977).  It would 
probably be most accurate to describe the appellate court’s determination as a hybrid because it 
applied a business necessity standard to hold the employer liable for disparate treatment.  Id. at 1090. 
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employer must justify its practice as the best available, and further holding 
that the disparate impact theory was an inappropriate model for the case.267  
In the Court’s eyes, this was a straightforward intentional discrimination 
case; there was nothing unintentional about the practice or its effects, with 
the ultimate question being whether such a policy was permissible—
whether there was some nondiscriminatory reason for proceeding in the 
employer’s chosen manner.  Ultimately, this was not a question that 
required the disparate impact framework, and in fact, moving into that 
framework suggested that the employer did not intend its practices and per-
haps was even unaware of its results.  But the employer was fully aware that 
its workforce was predominantly white, and it knew that its practice led to 
that result (what else could have?), and that should have been enough to 
treat the case as involving intentional discrimination.  That does not 
resolve the question of whether relying on referrals or personal knowledge 
was discriminatory; it only suggests that the disparate impact theory was 
unnecessary to adjudicate the case.  Indeed, the disparate impact theory 
would have been necessary only if, by intent, one meant racial animus. 
A more recent case demonstrates that the confusion over the meaning 
of intentional discrimination is not a relic of the past.  Joe’s Stone Crab is a 
restaurant and institution in Miami Beach, and one of the highest grossing 
restaurants in the country, even though it is only open for nine months out 
of the year.  Historically, all of Joe’s waiters were men, and other than for a 
short period during World War II, that had always been true.  The EEOC 
filed a sex discrimination lawsuit against Joe’s, and for reasons that were 
never explained pursued the case as a disparate impact claim, despite the fact 
that it was neither a mystery nor an accident why Joe’s only had male 
waiters.268  Until some time in the 1980s, and often well beyond, nearly all 
fine dining establishments employed male waiters as part of their cultivated 
atmosphere.269  Again, the only reason the disparate impact theory might 
have been used in this context is because the owner, who was a woman, had 
                                                                                                                            
 267. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 571.  In dissent, Justices Marshall and Brennan argued that the case 
should have been remanded for further development of the disparate impact claim.  Id. at 583–84 
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 268. See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the 
disparate impact approach of the district court). 
 269. A newspaper report noted that in 1990, in three of Chicago’s fanciest restaurants there 
were no women on the waitstaff.  One industry analyst explained, “It has been customary 
throughout the years for fine dining establishments to hire only males.  Waiters seem to be the 
preference of the elite in fine dining operations.”  Nina Burleigh, Discriminating Taste Is Taken to Court, 
CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1990, at C2; see also David Neumark et al., Sex Discrimination in Restaurant 
Hiring: An Audit Study, 111 Q.J. ECON. 915 (1996) (documenting discrimination in Philadelphia 
fine restaurants based on resumes). 
778 53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 701 (2006) 
 
never proclaimed in so many words that she refused to hire women or that she 
thought women were incompetent to perform the work.270  Such a limited 
definition of intent could only have arisen in the context of the availability of a 
disparate impact theory.  Ultimately, the appellate court corrected the error,271 
but the case exemplifies the way in which our definition of intent has been 
unnecessarily circumscribed through the misuse of the impact framework.272 
This limited definition of intent is not confined to a few aberrational 
cases but runs throughout the scholarly literature as well, and has become 
particularly prominent in the recent focus on what is described as uncon-
scious or subtle discrimination.  Inspired by the work of Charles Lawrence 
and Linda Hamilton Krieger importing the insights of social psychology 
into law, many scholars have sought to explain the ways in which contem-
porary discrimination has become more subtle over time and is often 
unconscious in the sense that the individual may be unaware of his or her 
own motives for the underlying actions.273  Subtle discrimination often is 
equated with institutional or structural discrimination, and it also can be 
the product of cumulative acts that individually might be relatively innocuous 
but together produce substantial disadvantages for women and minorities.274  
Because subtle discrimination is not fueled by a conscious motive or any 
                                                                                                                            
 270. Joe’s Stone Crab, 220 F.3d at 1263.  A maitre d’, with hiring authority, did testify that 
the positions were “male server” type of jobs, and there was other evidence that readily supported 
a theory of intentional discrimination.  Id. at 1270. 
 271. Id. at 1283 (noting that the case appeared to be one of “intentional sex discrimination” 
and remanding for further findings).  In so doing, the court specifically noted that the lower court 
had erroneously applied a definition of intent that required “animus” or “malice.”  Id. at 1283–84. 
 272. An even more curious application of the theory arose in the Seventh Circuit where the 
court applied a disparate impact theory to a fetal protection policy that, on its face, excluded 
fertile women from employment opportunities in a battery-making facility.  See UAW v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 886 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).  The Seventh Circuit was following 
the lead of two other circuits.  Id. at 884–85.  The Supreme Court unanimously reversed this 
determination, holding that the policy should have been subjected to scrutiny as facially 
discriminatory.  See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991). 
 273. The seminal articles in the law review literature are those by Lawrence, supra note 10, and 
Krieger, supra note 20.  Both of these articles explore the subtle operation of discrimination in 
contemporary culture with a particular emphasis on race discrimination, and both articles suggest 
that the intentional discrimination framework is inadequate to address discrimination that is often 
the product of what the authors describe as unconscious motives.  For other recent work on subtle 
discrimination, see Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation 
and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (2001); Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, 
Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529 (2003).  The literature 
is nicely summarized in Moran, supra note 243, at 2391–400. 
 274. For important works on structural or institutional discrimination, see VIRGINIA 
VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (1998); Tristin K. Green, 
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black 
Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493 (1996). 
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express animus, there has been a struggle in the literature to determine 
whether existing proof structures can accommodate the changed nature of 
discrimination, and some scholars have proposed new proof structures that 
typically fuse elements of intent and impact.275 
As is true with claims of intent more generally, the idea that the exist-
ing disparate treatment framework is inadequate to remedy subtle dis-
crimination turns on both a limited definition of intent and a mistaken 
belief in the power of legal models or doctrine.  The first point is easier to 
establish than the second.  In most of the literature, the most common form of 
subtle discrimination involves stereotyping, where women, African 
Americans, the aged, or the disabled are treated differently because of per-
ceptions regarding their abilities or interests.276  These stereotypes are not 
conscious in the sense that the actors express a belief in the differential 
abilities—and if one were asked, they would almost certainly deny any such 
belief.  But their actions indicate otherwise, and African Americans may be 
consigned to different jobs, or afforded different opportunities, because of 
underlying stereotypes regarding their abilities.  Women are subjected to similar 
disadvantages although often the underlying reasons may be different, and 
some of those reasons may involve conscious beliefs regarding women’s 
attachment to the labor force due to their likely primary responsibility for 
childrearing.  In these cases it may be tempting to reach for the disparate 
impact model because there often will be a statistically significant disparity 
traceable to a particular practice, or practices.  Yet such a move would be 
entirely unnecessary and in many respects a serious mistake.  The Supreme 
Court has expressly defined stereotyping as a form of intentional dis-
crimination,277 and cases involving stereotyping or other forms of subtle dis-
crimination are properly defined as involving intentional discrimination, so long 
as intent does not equate to animus.  Class action claims of structural 
discrimination are readily adjudicated under the pattern or practice 
framework, perhaps the most underdeveloped theory in employment dis-
crimination law.278  The pattern or practice theory relies on statistics to 
                                                                                                                            
 275. See Green, supra note 274, at 149–52 (proposing a structural model); Krieger, supra 
note 20, at 1242–47 (advocating a mixed motives framework); Oppenheimer, supra note 255, at 
915–17 (proposing a negligence standard). 
 276. See, e.g., VALIAN, supra note 274, at 103–44; Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work 
a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459 (2003). 
 277. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 278. Two cases, both decided in 1977, remain the leading cases on pattern or practice 
claims.  See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).  A subsequent case discussed the kinds of statistical proof 
relevant to proving the claims.  See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986). 
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prove intentional discrimination similar to how the disparate impact theory 
relies on statistics to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  The 
difference arises in the defendants’ rebuttal.  In a pattern or practice case, 
the defendant seeks to explain why the statistics are not the product of dis-
crimination, why, for example, they might be the product of different 
qualifications or interests, and this debate allows courts to understand how 
discrimination continues to pervade the workplace. 279  Yet, it seems plain 
that the underdevelopment of the theory is a side effect of the disparate 
impact theory. 
I am not implying that stereotyping or subtle discrimination is easy to 
prove under an intentional discrimination framework because it is not.  But 
the disparate impact theory does not ease that burden.  The real difficulty 
with proving subtle discrimination is convincing courts, and I would sug-
gest, our society, that subtle discrimination exists and that employers ought 
to be responsible for remedying that discrimination.  In a recent article, 
Professor Sam Bagenstos raised precisely this question, noting that there 
exists no societal consensus regarding an employer’s responsibility for reme-
dying subtle discrimination, and I would add that we have no consensus 
that subtle discrimination permeates the workplace.280  No legal doctrine is 
going to create that consensus.  What is necessary is a broader social 
movement that seeks to explain how pervasive discrimination remains, and 
how discrimination continues to disadvantage women and minorities, the 
disabled, and the aged—how discrimination has in fact become more subtle 
but no less intentional or free from legal liability.  Successful social movements 
typically depend on both political and legal action, but the disparate impact 
theory always has been a peculiarly legal theory, and is not well known 
outside of law.281  Public opinion was never mobilized, and over the last 
                                                                                                                            
 279. The notorious case involving Sears is a classic example of a failed pattern or practice 
case, one that has doomed such claims in the eyes of many scholars.  See Green, supra note 274, at 
122–24.  In EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988), the district court 
accepted the employer’s explanation that women were less interested in commissioned sales to 
explain the lack of women in those positions.  While this case should have come out differently, 
moving to a disparate impact model would not have convinced the district court judge that the 
disparities were the product of anything other than women’s interests.  This case involved a failure 
to convince the judge, who may not have been open to convincing, that discrimination was 
responsible, rather than a failure of the theory more generally. 
 280. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 
94 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 45–47), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=701265. 
 281. In her recent article discussing social movements and affirmative action, Professor 
Tomiko Brown-Nagin makes the point that it is necessary to target public opinion in mobilizing 
for change.  See Brown-Nagin, supra note 111, at 1516.  She notes how the intervenors’ position 
emphasizing the continuing effects of discrimination as a justification for discrimination never 
captured the public support that the diversity rationale garnered.  Id. 
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thirty years, we have never had a sustained public debate regarding the 
persistence of discrimination or society’s responsibility for the racial and 
gender disparities we observe.  In contrast, two areas where public debates 
have arisen, sexual harassment law following the hearings of Justice 
Clarence Thomas and the citizenship of gay and lesbian individuals, have 
evolved significantly.282  Seeking to create a different theory of equality 
solely through a legal doctrine, one that was in tension with our societal 
commitments and the interests of elites, was a doomed project.  And in 
some ironic sense, the move to the disparate impact theory perhaps allowed 
the Supreme Court to see less discrimination, and to remain confined to a 
conception of intentional discrimination that turned on outdated notions 
of motive and intent. 
My argument that the presence of the disparate impact theory may 
have stunted the evolution of a more robust definition of intentional dis-
crimination raises the question of why the Supreme Court would have been 
receptive to a more expansive definition of intent when it had such a crabbed 
view of the disparate impact theory.  There is obviously no way of knowing 
for sure, but as I have discussed earlier, intent is a central aspect of our 
conception of discrimination, and indeed, the idea of intent pervades many 
aspects of the law.  In other areas, such as criminal law, constitutional torts, 
and even torts itself, courts have been receptive to varying, and often more 
expansive, interpretations of intent.  In contrast, the impact theory remains 
isolated within antidiscrimination law.  For these reasons, had disparate 
impact claims been recast as claims of intent in the early years, it seems 
quite likely that the Supreme Court may have been willing to conceive of the 
concept of intent in a different light—one that was not tied to issues of animus. 
The disparate impact theory obviously did not cause our limited vision 
of discrimination, but it was symptomatic of that limited imagination, and, 
more importantly, of our limited desire to remedy discrimination.  
Ultimately the disparate impact theory had it all backwards: The theory 
could only have succeeded in a society that was committed to eradicating 
the deep effects of discrimination—subtle, intentional, societal, however 
defined—and yet, that sort of society would, just as clearly, not have needed 
the disparate impact theory, as there would have been a collective will bent 
on doing the work otherwise delegated to courts.  Perhaps the ultimate 
                                                                                                                            
 282. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which prohibits the criminalization of 
homosexual sodomy, thus repudiating Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  On sexual 
harassment law, progressive feminist scholars have begun to argue that the doctrine has gone too 
far in seeking to eliminate harassment.  See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE 
L.J. 2061 (2003). 
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mistake of the disparate impact theory was a belief that our society and 
courts were better than they are, and that the law alone could create a 
theory of discrimination and equality without broader social support. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me now return to the question posed at the outset, namely 
whether the disparate impact theory was a mistake.  This is not an easy 
question to answer, and it might be best to break it down into various parts.  
Certainly there can be little question that the disparate impact theory has 
produced limited meaningful change, and that a broader definition of intent 
could have served virtually the same purpose.  If Congress had the will, the 
testing claims also could have been addressed through legislation dictating 
the kinds of examinations that were permissible, or the kinds of justifica-
tions that were acceptable.  With that in mind, if nothing else, perhaps this 
Article will lead to a ceasefire on proposals to extend the disparate impact 
theory into other areas. 
I think it is also clear that the disparate impact theory was based on two 
critical mistakes—that the theory would be easier to prove and that it was 
possible to redefine discrimination purely through legal doctrine.  At 
bottom, that is what the theory sought to do—redefine our concept of dis-
crimination to focus on unequal results.  As we know from our lengthy battle 
over affirmative action, there is no widespread public support for defining 
equality or discrimination in terms of results or achievements.  The creation 
of the disparate impact theory also has contributed to a stiflingly limited 
view of intentional discrimination, one that even today is tied to animus 
and conscious motives, and one that leaves us awash in racial and gender 
inequities but without any clear sense of responsibility or liability for those 
inequities.  By itself, a broader judicial definition of intent would not have 
led to less inequality, but it may have opened our eyes to the persistence of 
discrimination in a way that the disparate impact theory could not.  So in 
the end I conclude that the disparate impact theory was a mistake, which 
leaves the question of whether it is now too late to turn back. 
